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A bstr a c t

This paper seeks to explore the root factors which prevent Egyptian Christians,
commonly know as Copts, from successfully participating in the country’s mainstream
political system. The state of Copts in Egypt warrants significant attention, yet most
reports consider their under-represented status to stem from discrimination from the
country’s majority Muslim community.

While that dynamic is present in varying

degrees, it does not explain the Coptic Orthodox Church’s unwavering support for the
ruling party and President Hosni Mubarak.

Not only did the Church endorse the

President during the recent 2005 elections, it has also carried out censures of secular
Coptic activists who push for reform.
This study contends that the failure of Copts to be properly represented in
government is not due to simple discrimination, but is linked to the same phenomenon
which constrains any pluralism within Egyptian politics. The Coptic Church, instead of
pressuring for political reform, has entered into a patron-client relationship with the state.
This relationship sees that the President supports policies which are religiously
significant for the Church in return for a commitment from the clergy to continually
instruct its congregation to support the ruling party. The problem of Coptic political
participation is therefore little different than that of any other political group within the
Egyptian state. Co-operation with the ruling party politically is necessary in order to
carry out activities without constraint. For the Coptic Church, this entails a great deal of
autonomy in the conduct of religious affairs in return for granting the ruling party
autonomy within the political sphere.

iii
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C

h apter one:

In t r o d u c t io n A

nd

M

ethodology

The Coptic Orthodox Church has its roots in St. Mark’s legendary proselytizing
journey to Egypt in the first century A.D. Since then, Egypt has had a turbulent history,
with various authorities vying for control of a country which was strategically important
both in its location and the resources it contained. After the fall of Byzantine authority in
the country in 641 A.D., Egyptian Christians gradually became the minority of the
population and faced varying levels of tolerance from different rulers over the centuries.1
Under the British rule for example, Copts were politically marginalized in an attempt to
assure Muslims that the protectorate was not a Christian occupation. Still, during the 19th
Century, the Copts had been allowed to participate as accountants and tax collectors, a
role which saw the creation of a wealthy Christian elite.2 Later, during the pre
revolutionary period, Christian communities organized rallies and conferences dedicated
towards increasing their place in the bureaucracy and challenging laws which
undermined their rights.3 Joining with Muslim nationalist groups, the Copts represented
an extremely active political force within the Egyptian parliament, especially within the
Egyptian Wafd party.4
Gamal Abdul Nasser’s revolution would change every element of Egyptian
politics. Undermining the power of Egypt’s entire upper class through initiatives like the
1952 re-distribution of land and the nationalizing of foreign business, power shifted

1 P.J. Vatikiotis, The History o f Egypt 2nd ed., (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1980), 14.
2 S.S. Hasan, Copts vs. Muslims in Egypt: A Century’s Long Fight for Equality (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003), 33.
3 Otto F.A. Meinardus, Two Thousand Years o f Coptic Christianity (Cairo: The American University o f
Cairo University Press, 1999), 75.
4 Hasan, 40.
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quickly into a centralized state apparatus.5 The Christian upper classes were no longer
effective in achieving political participation in the new authoritarian structure and in
many cases, emigrated from the country. The middle class, much closer to the Coptic
clergy, assumed increasing power and helped the Church create an autonomous religious
sphere outside the mainstream Egyptian political environment.6 Much of this renewal of
clerical hegemony revolved around new social programs which sought to ensure that
•

•

Copts became progressively more engaged with the Church.

7

During the presidency of Anwar Sadat, relations between the Coptic clergy and
the ruling party were increasingly strained. Both authorities routinely challenged the
other throughout the 1970s, with Sadat accusing the Coptic Patriarch, Shenuda III of
trying to set up its own state.8 Coptic Christians were equally critical, some referring to
the President as “Satan’s ally”.9 In the end, Sadat moved to arrest over 150 members of
the clergy, including the Coptic Patriarch himself in an attempt to undermine what he saw
as a potential challenge to his system of control.10
Upon his release by President Hosni Mubarak however, Pope Shenuda had moved
to stress a message of reconciliation with the state.11 A new position of unqualified
support for the ruling party would now accompany a continued and less obstructed
commitment to programs of religious revitalization which the Church pursued so
controversially before.

5 Vatikiotis, 392-393.
6 Hasan, 58.
7 Ibid., 3.
8 Ibid., 10.
9 Ibid., 6.
10 Meinardus, 85. The details o f the Pope’s imprisonment will be discussed in depth later in this study.
11 Ibid., 85.

2
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It is the belief of this study that the transition by Pope Shenuda and the Coptic
clergy represented the construction of a clientelist relationship between the Church and
state. The ruling party, under President Mubarak, allows the Church to have unparallel
religious authority in return for their political support. The following chapters will detail
the dynamics of this relationship, with focus being placed on the system of controls the
government uses to restrict political space within Egypt, as well as the environment of
vulnerability it maintains to coerce the Church into remaining its client.

Moreover,

attention will also be placed on the Church itself, and how it maintains control over the
Coptic community and secular political groups who seek to challenge the status quo.
Finally, this study will examine the specifics of the exchange between the ruling party
and the Church, outlining what each provides the other within the system.
Understanding this relationship is important for several reasons.

First, it

contributes to an understanding of the root causes of political stagnation in the Middle
East in general, a topic which has attracted a great deal of scholastic attention. Second, it
provides a nuanced and detailed description of Coptic political attitudes and the clientelist
environment within the Egyptian state. This is significant, because the welfare of the
Coptic Christian community within Egypt is a growing policy concern within the
American, Canadian and EU member governments, pressured both by Christian action
groups and the Coptic Diaspora. Oversimplification of the relationship between Coptic
Christians and the ruling party represents a serious concern, as it may be a foundation for
poor policy initiatives.

Contributions to this literature are greatly needed to mend a

severe deficiency that exists within understandings of the political activities of the Coptic

3
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Church so that more effective steps may be taken to increase Christian participation in
Egyptian politics.
Reflections on Literature
The unique nature of a case study can be problematic when determining a relevant
body of literature to examine. In many ways, a specific case may be open to influence
from a wide range of phenomenon, all of which must be taken into account to fully
appreciate its dimensions. That said, the specific nature of a case study may cause only
part of a body of literature to be relevant to the topic at hand. Moreover, since this study
in particular proposes to build up a knowledge base which is in its infancy, few directly
applicable examinations on this specific topic currently exist. Therefore, when dealing
with an area that contains a distinct research deficiency, a complimentary examination of
multiple streams of research is essential in order to produce a comprehensive fusion of
knowledge on a topic. For the purposes of this paper, three streams of literature will be
examined, including works dealing with good governance in the Arab region, Islamism
and the Coptic Christian Church and community.

For each of these topics, multiple

themes and approaches exist and will be explored in order to underline many of the
theoretical assumptions which will be discussed in the next chapter, as well as factors
which affect the relationship between the Coptic Church and state.
Good Governance in the Arab Region
The root cause of the Arab region’s failure to achieve standards of good
governance is a source of deep ideological and scholarly divide.

For the purposes of
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simplicity, the debate will be generalized within this study to two broad groups, described
here as the “essentialist” and “structuralist” schools.

10

The essentialist school, as its name implies, sets out to describe a series of fixed
cultural and religious traits which are alleged to politically significant and inherent to the
region. These arguments are based on what Robert K. Kaufman (1974) describes as
“cultural irrationality”, which stem from the innate, static characteristics of a society.

11

Despite its controversial premise, the theory remains at the heart of concepts of Middle
East “exceptionalism” which continue to be used to explain the failure of democracy to
spread into Arab and Muslim countries. In the opinion of most essentialist scholars,
Islamic religious and Arabic social values are at the heart of the region’s pervasive
inability to achieve standards of good governance. What the West considers to be norms
of pluralist political systems therefore will not form organically in this environment.
Perhaps the most famous work expounding this theory is Samuel P. Huntington’s
The Clash o f Civilizations and the Remaking o f the World Order (1996), based on his
earlier article of the same name.14 Here Huntington describes an increasingly intense
“historical antagonism” between the Christian West and the Muslim world, discussing
relations in the terms of a new Cold War.15 It is the incompatibility of the values of these
two civilizations which will lead to future conflict. Facing off criticisms of Huntington’s
thesis, Ronald Ingleheart and Pippa Norris back up the essentialist argument by using the
World Values Survey to underline differences in social mentalities (mostly with regard to

12 Although the term “structuralist” is commonly used in literature, the term “essentialist” is unique to this
study and refers to arguments which state the root cause o f underdevelopment is culturally specific.
13 Robert R. Kaufman, “The Patron-Client Concept and Macro Politics: Prospects and Problems,”
Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 16, No.3 (Jan 1974): 285.
14 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o f Civilizations and the Remaking o f the World Order (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1997).
15 Huntington, 212.
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gender and sexual liberalism) between Western and Islamic cultures.16 Arguing that
culture may now override political realities to create conflict, they propose that societal
values shape the structures of the Arab region, moving it away from democracy and
reform.17 The impact of cultural realities on politics is also emphasised in Hisham
Sharabi’s work Neopatriachy: A Theory o f Distorted Change in Arab Society (1988),
which links authoritarianism in the Arab politics to the intense patriarchal environment in
which it developed.18 According to Sharabi, these phenomena extend to Islamic traditions
as well because they too have been formed around intensely patriarchal norms.19
Although the model presented by Sharabi, Huntington and Ingleheat-Norris each
differ slightly, all come to the same essentialist conclusion. Each view traditional values
and norms within Arabic society as the root of clientelism, tyranny and oppression in the
region. Political culture therefore becomes an overriding factor which prevents Arab
•

•

•

•

states from moving past patriarchy and authoritarianism.
The structuralist approach explains the systemic failure to achieve good
governance in the Arab/Muslim world from a different approach. Instead of focusing on
cultural generalities, the structuralist approach outlines specific historical or political
factors which maintain the authoritarian status quo.

One such theory, clientelism,

describes all interactions as a series of rational exchanges between actors, regardless of
their culture or religion. The roots of this theory can be traced to studies which began as
early as the 1940s and 50s in the field of sociology and anthropology.

Within two

16 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “The True Clash o f Civilizations,” Foreign Policy No. 135
(March/April 2003): 67-74.
17 Inglehart and Norris, 74.
18 Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriachy: A Theory o f Distorted Change in Arab Society (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988), 7.
19 Sharab, 11.
20 Moheb Zaki, Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World: Annual Report 2004 (Cairo: Ibn
Khaldun Center for Development Studies, 2004), 23.

6
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decades, the ramifications of this theory of interpersonal relations were being redefined
and reinterpreted to gauge their impact on relationships between political actors.

21

These

initial articles, often found in multi-disciplinary journals, would eventually culminate into
major works such as Eisenstadt and Roniger’s Patrons, Clients and Friends (1984),
Roniger and Gunes-Ayata’s Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society (1994) and
Schmidt’s

Friends, Followers and Factions (1977), the latter being extensively
•

•

committed to exploring the political ramifications of clientelism.

22

The nature and definitions of clientelism are for the most part consistent within
the literature. Defined by Roniger and Gunes-Ayata (1994) as “asymmetric but mutually
beneficial and open-ended transactions...”, clientelism has also been described as a
“institutionalized general exchange” between political actors.

According to

Lemarchard and Lagg (1972), an unequal distribution of power is essential, as any
equilibrium would cause the system to collapse.24 Others stress the difference between
clientelism and feudalism, arguing that unlike medieval political structures, modern
relations between the patron and the client are not overt and formalized.

That said, laws

can create an informal framework that facilitates transactions between the patron and the

21 See Rene Lemarchard and Keith Lagg, “Political Clientelism and Development,” Comparative Politics
Vol. 4, No. 2 (Jan 1972): 149-178, Robert R. Kaufman, “The Patron Client Concept and Macro Politics:
Prospects and Problems,” Comparative Studies o f Society and History Vol. 16. No. 3 (January 1974): 284308, S.N. Eisenstadt and Louis Roniger, “Patron-Client Relations as a Mode o f Structuring Social
Exchange,” Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 22, No. 1 (Jan 1980): 42-77, and Sharon
Kettering “The Historical Development o f Political Clientelism,” Journal o f Interdisciplinary History Vol.
18, No. 3. (Winter 1988): 419-447.
22 Luis Roniger and Ayse Gunes-Ayata, Democracy. Clientelism and Civil Society (Boulder Lynne Reinner
Publications, 1994), S.N. Eisenstadt and Luis Roniger, Patrons. Clients and Friends: Interpersonal
Relations and the Structure o f Trust in Society (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), and Steffen
W. Schmidt et al., comps., Friends Followers and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism (Los Angeles:
University o f California Press, 1977).
23 Roniger and Gunes-Ayata, 3 and Eisenstadt and Roniger, Patrons. Clients and Friends: Interpersonal
Relations and the Structure o f Trust in Society. 37.
24 Lemarchard and Lagg, 152.
25 Kettering, 420.

7
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subordinate.26 Finally, the informality of the transaction allows it to be theoretically
voluntary, with the subordinate able to abandon their role if they choose.

27

The formation of a patron-client network also seems to be largely agreed upon, as
those with control of resources seek to protect their subordinates from material
instability.28 These resources can appear in several forms, but for the most part, they
manifest most commonly as economic or political patronage.

These relationships are

not inherent to underdeveloped societies, but can advance and transform themselves as
politics within a region develop.30 Bypassing cultural and religious factors, structuralist
scholars argue a series of institutional realities put in place historically form an
intractable system which restricts the movement of political groups.
The structuralist argument is much more apparent when examining works which
deal with specific case studies, unlike the essentialist school which revolves mainly
around broad generalized arguments. Instead of discussing the Muslim world as a whole,
many structuralist case studies tend to focus on constitutional, legal, political or economic
realities within a specific country to induce conclusions which can later be applied
regionally.

o 1

Several scholars have discussed the Egyptian system from a structuralist
standpoint. A key example of this would be an article by Mona Makram-Ebeid (2001),
which describes the political structures which impede the creation of a competitive

26 Kaufman, 297.
27 Roniger and Gunes-Ayata, 3 and Eisenstadt and Roniger, Patrons. Clients and Friends: Interpersonal
Relations and the Structure o f Trust in Society. 48.
28 Roniger and Gunes-Ayata, 5.
29 Eisenstadt and Roniger, “Patron-Client Relations as a Mode o f Structuring Social Exchange”, 50.
30 Kettering, 419.
31 Much o f the literature examined here will focus on Egypt as case studies o f additional countries are not
entirely relevant for the purposes o f this paper.

8

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

multiparty system within Egypt.32

These include disrupting opposition parties’

organization efforts and even engaging in tactics of sectarian slander to secure victory.

33

With a monopoly on state resources, the ruling party under President Hosni Mubarak is
able to control both the country’s legislature and media, passing censorship and
emergency law restrictions that can be used to frustrate other political parties.34 Maye
Kassem’s work Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics o f Authoritarian Rule (2004), outlines
political tactics of the ruling party in great detail, demonstrating how the regime created a
system where parliamentarians, civil servants and the military have direct political
dependence on the executive.35
Legal restrictions also represent a major structural factor which bars reform and
facilitates the patron-client system.

Many of these impediments are found in the

executive’s ability to manipulate the constitution to support their own purposes.
Executive powers in the Egyptian constitution outweigh the powers of the judicial and
legislative branches combined, making a centralized authoritarian state a reality which
quickly results in clientelist relations.36 Moreover, the executive’s control over the ruling
party in parliament and its ability to choose judges, underm ines efforts to implement
reform.

These structures, according to the Arab Human Development Report, create a

32 Mona Makram-Ebeid, “Egypt’s 2000 Parliamentary Elections,” Middle East Policy Vol. VIII, No. 2
(June 2001): 33.
33 Makram-Ebeid, 33.
34 Jihad Ouda, Negad al-Borai and Hafez Abu Se’ada, A Door to the Desert: Egyptian Parliamentary
Elections in 2001. Course. Dilemmas and Recommendations for the Future: A Political and Legal Study,
trans. Sohair Sabry (Cairo: United Group, 2001), 35-39.
35 Maye Kassem, Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics o f Authoritarian Rule (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2004), 19, 30, 32.
36 Ouda, al-Borai and Abu Se’ada, 19.
37 Kassem, 30, 36.

9
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“black-hole state” which freezes any attempt to challenge the regime or bypass the
patron-client pyramid.
A great deal of attention has also fallen on the economic structures which bar
reform in Arab states.

Roger Owen’s monograph, State Power and Politics in the

Making o f the Modern Middle East (2004) places extensive significance on strategic rents
(such as foreign aid given to Egypt because of their support during the 1991 Gulf War)
which give states economic autonomy from their population.39 Richards and Waterbury
(1996) agree, arguing that social welfare systems used to co-opt citizenry financially into
the patron-client system are propped up by economic rent.40 These funds allow the state
to employ a massive workforce, giving the executive tremendous pressure over the
economy and raising the negative consequences of citizens who wish to escape the
patron-client system.41
Islamism
Scholarly attention devoted to Islamist movements is significant in understanding
the wider political environment which surrounds Egyptian system.

The growth of

political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its more radical counterparts has a
direct impact on the dynamics of the relationship between the Coptic Church and the
Egyptian ruling party. In fact, so important is the role of Islamists on the relationship in
question that an entire chapter of this study will be devoted to exploring how it affects the

38 Barbara Brewka, Zahir Jamal eds., Arab Human Rights Report 2004: Towards Freedom in the Arab
World (New York, The United Nations Development Programme, 2005), 11.
39 Roger Owen, State Power and Politics in the Making o f the Modem Middle East. 3rd ed. (New York
Routledge, 2004), 114-116.
40 Alan Richards and John Waterbury, A Political Economy o f the Middle East. 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1996; reprint 1998), 209.
41 Merih Celasum, State Owned Enterprises in the Middle East and North Africa: Privatization and Reform
(Cairo: American University o f Cairo Press, 2001), 65.

10
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Coptic mindset. For that reason, it is essential to examine the growing body of literature
surrounding this phenomenon.
As with the discourse on good governance, several different arguments have
developed to explain and describe the use of religion as a political ideology. Once again,
the literature will be broken down within this study into two generalized branches, those
that argue political Islam is a fa?ade masking traditional political ideologies, and those
arguing that religious movements genuinely challenge the status quo.
Roger Owen (2004) argues that even the most secular leaders in the Muslim
world have attempted to cloak their ideologies in the veil of Islam.

Specifically, he

focuses on the activities of former Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, who despite
his strong socialist leanings, produced an Islamic fatwa (religious ruling) supporting all
of his major decisions.42 John L. Esposito (2005) agrees, arguing that Islam has been used
to justify every imaginable system of government43 Oliver Roy’s work, The Failure o f
Political Islam (1994), expands on this idea, claiming the link between Islamist political
ideologies and the actual teachings of the religion is extremely problematic, as these
movements often consists merely of dated socialist and nationalist ideas recast under a
religious banner.44 Amyn B. Sajoo (2004) and Shireen Hunter (2005) agree, claiming
that Islam has been used as a fa<?ade to serve several leaders’ agendas, especially in
strengthening patronage.45

42 Owen, 29.
43 John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988 reprint
2005), 223.
44 Oliver Roy, The Failure o f Political Islam, trans. Carol Volk (Cambridge, Harvard University Press,
1994), 4.
45 Amyn B. Sajoo, ed. Civil Society in the Muslim World: Contemporary Perspectives (New York: IB
Tauris, 2004), 57 and Shireen T. Hunter and Huna Malk, eds., Modernization. Democracy and Islam
(London: Praeger and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 83.

11

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

The other main argument contends that Islam is a challenge to the traditional
state.

Sullivan (1999), gives extensive evidence to describe how pervasive Islamist

groups are within the regions’ NGOs, universities and youth groups.46 Wickham (2002),
provides exhaustive details on the process of social and institutional Islamification,
highlighting the way in which Islamist groups were able to spread throughout Egyptian
proffessional syndicates during the 1980s and 1990s 47 The challenge of Islamists is not
always seen as negative within this literature, as many scholars, such as Ebrahim Mossa,
have given attention to ways in which these activists are attempting to harmonize their
values with existing international norms such as the United Nations Charter of Human
Rights.48
The Coptic Christians
Literature on the Coptic Christian Church in Egypt differs slightly when
compared to works which focused on clientelism and Islamism, primarily because of the
focus being on individuals or groups rather than a theory or ideology. Still, while there
may have been few contradicting arguments, there were three principle methods of
approaching discussions of the Coptic Christians. These approaches will be classified as
the Islamist approach, the historical approach, and the political approach.
The Islamist approach to discussing the Coptic Christian community typically
comes from Muslim scholars who place emphasis on primary sources of authority within
Islam, such as the Qur 'an, as well as the actions of the Prophet Muhammad and his

46 Denis J. Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs. the State
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 1, 29, 55.
47 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion. Activism and Political Change in Egypt (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 178-185.
48 Ebrahim Mossa, “The Dilemma o f Islamic Human Rights,” The Journal o f Law and Religion Vol. 15,
No. 1/2 (2000-2001): 195.
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closest companions. Within this framework, called the sunnah by Muslims, a theoretical
body of knowledge exists to instruct Muslims on how to conduct relations with religious
minorities. These constructs are therefore being closely examined by Islamists intent on
creating modem and practical solutions within a religiously acceptable framework. A.
Rahmam I. Doi’s study Non-Muslims under Shari’ah (1979) has examined the
approaches early Muslims took towards Christians with great detail, stressing the positive
nature of encounters for both sides.49 Using many of the authoritative Islamic examples
discussed above, other prominent Islamist scholars such a Abdul a’la Mawdudi (1961)
have also contributed to this approach, outlining a framework for dealing with nonMuslims in a theoretical Islamic state.50 Both discuss rights and responsibilities of nonMuslims under Islamic law, while defending the freedom they would enjoy as a protected
minority.51 Other works, such as Sohirin Mohammad Solihin’s Copts and Muslims in
Egypt: A Study in Harmony and Hostility (1991) are in response to particular political
events in the relationship between Christians and Islamists in Egypt. Solihin recounts
many o f the same rights Islamic law gives to Christians that Doi and Mawdudi describe,
but criticizes Copts for standing against attempts to codify Islamic law into the Egyptian
criminal system.52
More traditional academic literature on the Coptic Christian Church is also
divided. Many studies focus intensely on providing historical narratives of the Coptic

49 A. Rahman I. Doi, Non-Muslims under Shari’ah [Islamic Lawl (Brentwood: International Graphics,
1979), 76.
50 Abdul a’la Mawdudi, The Rights o f Non-Muslims in the Islamic State, trans. Khurshid Ahmad (Lahore:
Islamic Publications Limited, 1961), 4.
51 Mawdudi, 10, Doi, 26.
52 Sohirin Mohammad Solihin, Copts and Muslims in Egypt: A Study in Harmony and Hostility (Leicester:
The Islamic Foundation, 1991), 74-77.
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•

•

community’s history as well as the various theological beliefs that the clergy expounds.

53

Other studies, such as John H. Watson’s Among the Copts, have focused largely on
historical movements within the clergy, a dynamic not easily observed.54 Given the
proximity of Copts and other Christian groups to the Islamic world, several studies, such
as Margret J. Wyszomirski’s Communal Violence: The Armenians and the Copts as Case
Studies (1975) focus their attention on the realities of sectarian strife that have appeared
throughout the centuries between Muslims and Christians.55
Examining the political activity of Copts in Egypt is largely considered a taboo
activity, a stigma which has resulted in a severe deficit in scholarly literature. Since the
revolution, only a few attempts have been made to examine the political inactivity of the
Coptic Christians. B.L. Carter (1986) and Edward Wakin (1963) were two of the first
Western scholars to deal directly with the role of Coptic Christians in Egyptian politics,
outlining the rise of Copts in parliament before 1952 and the various discriminatory
realities which prevented the community from engaging politically under Nasser.56 More
recent examinations have focused on the role of the Coptic Church, as the clergy’s place
in politics has expanded greatly under the presidency of Hosni Mubarak, at the expense
of secular Coptic movements.57

The most comprehensive text on the Coptic political

activities is S.S. Hasan’s Copts vs. Muslims in Modern Egypt: The Centuries Long
53 See Kenneth Cragg, The Arab Christian: A History o f the Middle East (Westminster, John Knox Press,
1991), Robert Brenton Betts Christians in the Arab East (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1978), and Otto F. A.
Meinardus, Two Thousand Years o f Coptic Christianity (Cairo: American University o f Cairo Press, 1999).
54 John H. Watson, Among the Copts (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2000; reprint, 2002).
55 Margret J. Wyszomirski, “Communal Violence: The Armenians and the Copts as Case Studies,” World
Politics Vol. 27, No. 3 (April 1975): 430-455.
56 B.L. Carter, The Conts in Egyptian Politics (London: Croom Helm, 1986) and Edward Wakin, A Lonely
Minority: The Modem Story o f Egypt’s Copts (William Morrow, 1963; reprint, Lincoln: iUniverse.com,
Inc., 2000), ix.
57 See Nelly Van Doom-Harder and Kari Vogt, eds., Between the Desert and the City: The Coptic
Orthodox Church Today (Oslo: The Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, 1997) and Maya
Shatzmiller ed., Nationalism and Minority Identities in Islamic Societies (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2005).
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Struggle fo r Coptic Equality (2003). Hasan’s focus on Church activities, theology, and
the clerical monopolization of the Coptic political space demonstrates many of the critical
foundations for the Coptic community’s lack of political participation.58
The existing literature is problematic in several ways.

First, studies on the

political activities of the Coptic Christian community are in their infancy. Examinations
for the most part have been sporadic and are now often dated.

Popular conceptions of

the relationship between the Copts and the ruling party is also inaccurate, describing the
relationship as a simple unidirectional model, with the Coptic Church represented as a
victim of state discrimination.

This however, does little to explain the significant

warming of relations between the clergy and the executive branch that has occurred under
the Presidency of Hosni Mubarak. Moreover, it does not reflect evidence collected by
this study which suggests a reciprocal yet asymmetrical relationship between the Church
and state. This study hopes to contribute an alternative understanding of Coptic political
realities in Egypt by linking it to the broader failure for democratic reform in the region.
Methodology
The evidence within this research will primarily be qualitative, as political norms
are difficult to assess empirically without significant polling. Polling in the developing
world represents a serious challenge which cannot easily be overcome.

Language

barriers and financial demands present a challenge that is simply not surmountable at this
level.59 Alternative polling strategies, such as email or telephone polling is also not
feasible because o f the minimal technological capacity of Egyptians who reside outside
58 S.S. Hasan. Copts vs. Muslims in Modem Egypt: The Centuries Long Struggle for Coptic F,quality (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
59 Several studies, such as those by Mark Tessler, have attempted to carry out polling in the Middle East
and North Africa. Despite these important contributions, the region remains more difficult to quantitatively
examine than other areas within the developed world.
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of major urban centres. Moreover, due to the sensitive nature of this topic, permission
from the Egyptian Government to engage in such research is unlikely, and participation
would be difficult to secure. Those who do participate in polling may not understand the
questions being asked (due to lack of education), may face serious repercussions for their
answers (raising significant ethical concerns) or may have been coerced to provide
responses that are misleading.
Textual Research
That said, there is a wealth or writings on good governance and Islamism in Egypt
and the Arab region. These studies are significantly helpful when attempting to describe
the political environment that Coptic Christians belong within. Moreover, within this
study, several unpublished reports were collected with the help of the various human
rights groups in Cairo.

These reports, discussing legal, constitutional and sectarian

issues, were extremely helpful in forming a situational understanding. Moreover, reports
on specific events, such as the recent violence in Alexandria during the autumn of 2005,
were extremely detailed and constructive to the research process.
Qualitative evidence on Egyptian religious norms is available in the theology and
religious teachings of both the Egyptian Orthodox Church and Islamic scholars. This
includes doctrines on how Islam is to deal with religious minorities (commonly termed
dhimmis) and Orthodox Christian ascetic values which stress a retreat from civilization,
both themes that will be stressed in this study.

An examination of these (and other)

doctrines through religious text and scholarly writings will provide a strong base for
gauging the religious norms of these two traditions, helping to illustrate what impact
these have on the relationship in question.
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Interview Structure and Participants
Research into Egyptian religious norms and the patron-client system in Egypt was
carried out through unstructured interviews with a variety of experts within the Egyptian
political system.

The choice to not structure the interviews was deliberate, as the

sensitive nature of this topic often requires similar questions to be asked differently to
experts from different ideological/religious backgrounds.

Interviews were held with

representatives from human rights groups, Coptic journalists, Egyptian legal experts, and
Islamist in order to gain a wide perspective of how the issue of Coptic political
participation was conceptualized. This was significant due to time constraints which did
not allow for repeated extensive interviews. Therefore, interviews presented in this paper
will represent a broad thematic discourse from a variety of significant perspectives, rather
than a focused and detailed presentation of one.
Due to the financial and time constraints which faced this thesis, as well as the
previously mentioned factors which frustrate quantitative research in Egypt, a significant
amount of emphasis is placed on expert interviews as a source of evidence.

Although

this process was extremely beneficial, this study in no way alleges it can clearly and
comprehensively demonstrate in empirical terms that the dynamics of the Coptic-state
relationship are as the qualitative evidence describes.

That said, this study hopes to

succeed in outlining an alternative perspective with which to understand Coptic political
realities.
Interview Questions
The questions themselves were thematically consistent and discussed several key
points, including, the Church’s relationship with the executive, whether President
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Mubarak has improved Coptic human rights within Egypt, the positive and negative
impact of the clergy’s monopoly of the Christian community’s political discourse, and
the impact of Coptic theology on political participation.

Other questions involved

gauging the impact of Islamist groups on sectarian tensions, whether the executive
manipulates religious sentiments to maintain control, and the role of the Coptic diaspora
on Muslim-Christian relations within Egypt. Secondary questions were also raised and
were typically particular to each expert. This was to take advantage of unique personal or
professional insight that each had for the topic. Once again, a broad range of questions
were asked in order to take advantage of limited access to those being interviewed. In
depth examinations of each topic would have required several extensive meetings which
were not possible to secure. Since expediency was paramount, effort went to establishing
a consistent foundation with which to draw out overlapping themes.
Additional Resources
Significant material was collected from conferences that revolved around the
problem of religious freedom in Egypt. Unlike the interviews, these conferences would
be held in Arabic rather than English, presenting a significant linguistic barrier. In order
to overcome this conference sessions would be recorded in Arabic with the permission of
the discussion groups’ organizers. Translators were obtained to simultaneously relay the
discussion in English for recording in written notes. Additional primary material was
made available during these conferences, including NGO reports on sectarian violence
(the reports had been previously translated into English).
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Ethics

Ethical considerations were therefore fairly minimal.

First, interviews rarely

raised confidential information, as questions were directed to draw out the expert’s
knowledge of their field.

Each person interviewed was extensively educated, and

therefore demonstrated a strong intellectual capacity to understand what was being asked
of them. Before each interview commenced, permission was secured to use answers in
scholarly publications, including this thesis. Each was made aware of any recording
devices and was given the option of asking for the recording to pause in order to relay
confidential information.
Every attempt to maintain strict ethical standards was pursued because of the
potential harm which could come when discussing sensitive information in political
environment such as Egypt. Despite the nature of the people interviewed, their answers
can be politically damaging if misused, and all efforts have been taken to ensure that
notes and recordings remained secure while in Egypt.
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C h apter Tw

o

: T h e o r e t ic a l C o n s id e r a t io n s

In order to describe the constraints facing Coptic political participation in Egypt,
it is necessary to link them to the greater political realities in the region. Whereas most
studies have linked Coptic political inactivity to the intolerance of a primarily Muslim
society, it is the opinion of this study that it is linked to the very same phenomenon that
suppresses any sort of pluralism in the region. If the environment was simply one of
intolerance and persecution, one would expect to see the Coptic Church take an
antagonistic stance to the system,60 pushing for greater political participation in order to
combat discrimination. Instead, the Church encourages its members to actively support
the secular ruling party and censures Copts who are critical of the executive authority.61
This tendency towards internal censorship does not exist with regards to Islamic
extremism, as the Church has often been critical of sectarian violence.

fi)

What therefore,

is the nature and roots of this system of control? The following chapter will attempt to
answer this by focusing on theories that outline possible structural constraints to what has
been termed as ‘good governance’ in the Arab region. This process will attempt to
ascertain which theory is the most accurate when describing failures of political pluralism
in general and particularly within the relationship between Copts and the Egyptian state.

60 As it did under the Presidency o f Anwar Sadat, a period which will be examined in detail later in this
study.
61 This will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 5.
62 The relationship between the Church and Islamic extremism will be explored in Chapter 4.
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It is widely accepted that political movement within the Arab region is greatly
constrained.63 Therefore, the foundation of this system of control must be weighed as
several paradigms have been developed to describe the political realities of Arab states.
For some time, attention has been given to why the Arab region has failed to
develop principles of ‘good governance’.

Before continuing, it is important to

acknowledge that the notion of what good governance itself represents is problematic.
That said this study will seek to avoid prolonged discussion over what Thomas Wiess
describes as a term which outlines ideas of global problem solving at all levels.64 At the
same time however, it will accept that political and economic reforms in the Arab region
have, generally speaking, fallen behind most other regions in the world. Moreover, it will
be assumed that the ability to carry out changes is curtailed primarily by internal
phenomenon.
Explanations over the resiliency of Arabic regimes to resist change have largely
treated this region as exceptional to world norms.

As mentioned in Chapter One,

essentialist arguments bypass longstanding historical and political realities in order to focus
a great deal of emphasis on arguments which suggest the region is religiously or culturally
incompatible with ‘good governance’ principles. These conclusions will be deconstructed
in the following section in order to critically analyze whether Islamic or Arabic social
norms represent a mindset which keeps the political status quo of Arab regimes intact.

63 Attention will be given in detail to this in Chapter 3, where discussion o f the roots o f Egyptian state
power will be outlined.
64 Thomas G. Wiess, “Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance; Conceptual and Actual
Changes,” Third World Quarterly Vol. 21, No. 5 (2000): 796.
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Islam and Good Governance
As described above, the religion of Islam is regularly associated with the failure
of the Arab Region to adopt ideas of good governance. The first step in examining this
claim is selecting a definition for the term ‘religion’. Sociologists such as E.B. Taylor
have described religion as a person’s relationship with a supernatural being. For Emile
Durkheim, religion was a term which outlined one’s response to the “sacred”.65 For the
purposes of this study however, the definition for religion will, perhaps arrogantly,
diverge from the opinion these great scholars, as interest here lies in the teachings of the
religion itself and not its sociological elements.

Therefore, religion will be defined

wholly as a “theological ideal” which can be best understood by examining a particular
faith’s fundamental teachings.
A polemic against the essentialists would be tangential, as only a concise
overview of the key arguments is necessary to show that links between good governance
failures and Islam are problematic.66 One of the earliest essentialist arguments is found
in the German sociologist Max Weber’s classic work on religion and modernity, which
described Islam as completely devoid of “rational thinking” and represented an ideology
which could never be compatible with a progressive state.67 More modem scholars, like
Bernard Lewis, maintain that Islam represents a system which failed to absorb Western
innovations and steadily closed its doors to ideas of modernity.

While Weber’s study

can be seen in light of the historical period in which he was writing, Lewis’ modem

65 Vicky Randall and Robin Theobald eds., Political Change and Underdevelopment: A Critical
Introduction to Third World Politics. 2nd ed. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 61.
66 Such a study has already largely been complied in Edward Said’s Orientalism (New York: Random
House, 1978).
67 Hunter and Malik, 11.
68 See Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East
(New York: Perennial, 2002).
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explanations lack any evidence that Islam is theologically detrimental to progress. He
instead largely limits himself to describing the fall of the Islamic world from its place of
cultural predominance rather than explaining why this occurred.
Many arguments do however go further and examine particular interpretations
of Islamic theology, emphasising parts which seem to support the idea of authoritarian
rule.

For instance, many scholars draw a correlation between the Islamic idea of a

sovereign and absolute God and the prevalence of non-democratic states in the Middle
East.

This religious belief, it is claimed, gives Arab authoritarian states a strong

ideological foundation.69
Drawing correlations between Islam and politics is, in reality, much more difficult
than scholars often suggest. Islam itself is hardly a monolithic entity, and has been used
by both governments and opposition groups as a way to build legitimacy for their
policies.70 In fact, according to John L. Esposito,
The many interpretations and uses of Islam by
governments, movements, and individuals have produced a
diversity of ideologies, actors, organizations and programs.
Islam in recent years has been used to legitimize
monarchies (Morocco and Saudi Arabia), military regimes
(Pakistan, Libya, the Sudan) and a theocracy (Iran). Selfstyled Islamic regimes have spanned the political spectrum,
from radical socialism in Libya, to the conservative Saudi
71
monarchy.

Clearly Islam, a religion of 1.2 billion people spanning countless cultures and
ethnicities is too diverse to have broad and superficial conclusions prove accurate. In
fact; Oliver Roy has argued that the Muslim world can be divided into no less than four

69 Shrabi, 29.
70 Esposito, The Straight Path o f Islam. 159.
71 Ibid., 223.
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unique spheres, including Indo-Sunni, Arab-Sunni, Turkish Sunni and Persian-Shi’ite.

79

In reality, even these classifications encompass an enormous diversity of traditions.
Furthermore, the link between Islamist political ideology and the actual teachings of the
religion is problematic, as Roy successfully argues these movements that often consist
-i t

merely of dated socialist and nationalist ideas that are recast under a religious banner.
Given the broad nature of Islam, the only accurate way of gauging the religion’s
opinion on governance is to avoid a focus on the historical actions of Muslim leaders, but
to concentrate on the teachings of Islam’s key sources of authority.

For the

overwhelming majority of Muslims, the fundamental sources of authority are textual, and
include the Qur ’an (believed by Muslims to the literal word of God spoken through the
Prophet Muhammad), the Hadith (representing collected accounts of the Prophet’s own
sayings and actions as reported by his closest companions) and the sunnah (the pratical
example of the Prophet Muhammad). The Qur ’an speaks of governance indirectly, and,
despite the claims of Islamic political movements, holds few specifics for describing the
ideal political system. That said, it does instruct believers to conduct “their affairs by
mutual consultation”.74 This notion appears again in the Q ur’an, when Muhammad is
told by God to “consult them [members of the community] in affairs (of the moment)”.75
According to the tafsir, or Qur’anic commentary of Abdullah Yusuf Ali, these passages
refer to the concept of shura or consultation, an Arabic social construct which will be
examined in the coming paragraphs.

7 f\

72 Roy, 2.
73 Ibid., 4.
74 Q ur’an 42:38.
73 Q ur’an 3:159
76 Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Meaning o f the Holy Qur’an. 10th ed. (Beltsville: Amana Publications, 1999),
1257.
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The hadith also make mention of the notion of responsible governance and the
importance of confronting tyranny. Ibn Umar reported that Muhammad once said “every
one of you is a ruler and every one of you shall be responsible for those you rule...”
(Bukhari 11:11)

77

Ali also makes mention of the following Prophetic statement:

“obedience is due only in that which is good.” (Bukhari 64:61).

70

Other hadith (found in

Tirmidhi 17) states, “the most excellent jihad is the uttering of truth in the presence of an
7Q

unjust ruler”.

Although the above sayings are considered parts of the Prophet’s sunnah, more
evidence of Islam’s insistence on consultation can be derived from the biography of
Muhammad.

In the lead up to the first major engagement between the Muslim

community and Mecca’s pagan tribes, Muhammad consistently consulted with his army
on every major development. As his force made preparations around the wells of Badr,
one of Muhammad’s followers, A1 Hubab ibn al Mundhir ibn al Jamuh, made the
following critic:
O Prophet of God, is this spot where you have dismounted
a place to which God has guided you and, therefore, may
we neither step beyond it nor stay far behind it? Or is this
simply a question of ordinary war strategy, of measures and
moves and counter measures and moves?80

When Muhammad answered it was the latter, Al Hubab suggested a new position
which would cut off pagan army from the well’s water. Afterwards, Muhammad “sent a
reminder to all his companions that he is but a man like them, that all decisions have to

77 Maulana Muhammad Ali, A Manual o f Hadith (Dublin: The Ahmadiyya Anjuman Ishaat Islam Lahore
USA Inc., 1941; reprint, 2001), 328.
78 Ali, 331.
79 Ibid., 332.
80 Muhammad Husayn Haykal, The Life o f Muhammad. 8th ed., trans. Isma’il Ragi A. Al Faruqi (American
Trust Publications, 1976), 217-224.
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be taken by all of them in consultation with one another, that he will not decide anything
without them finally, and that he stands in great need of their good counsel.”81 Although
this situation underlines God’s unquestionable authority in Islam, consultation is clearly
stipulated amongst decisions made by human leadership, even that of Muhammad
himself.

It is therefore hard to justify the core teachings of Islam as encouraging

anything but an open and participatory system of governance, even if that has not been
adhered to by Muslim rulers in practice.
iL

Many Islamic scholars, such as the 19

Century Kurd, Abd al-Rahman al-

Kawakibi, wrote extensively on Islam and the state, and argued that the religion rejects
ideas of corruption and despotism and promotes the belief that “the just state, in which
men fulfill themselves, is that in which the individual is free and freely serves the
community, and in which the government watches over this freedom but is itself
controlled by the people; this is what the true Islamic state was”.82 Moreover, according
to an Islamists interviewed by Kevin Dwyer, the theology of Islam would in fact, greatly
challenge the authority o f the state.
As man is the representative of God on earth, there is an
equality between the governed and the governor. Islam
gives no more weight to the views of the governor to those
of the governed. This is of great importance and has three
correlates. First, Islam does not provide a foundation for
the state. Of course there is a tie between religion and
politics, but our basic texts do not call for the state. That is
why I believe that the Islamic state must be basically a non
state society, where civil society must attain real power in
order not to be absorbed by the state. Second whatever
state we have, it must not be very strong, it must only be
strong in essential but limited domains...human freedom is

81 Haykal, 217-224.
82 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (London: Oxford University Press 1962; reprint, New
York: Cambridge University Press 2004), 272.
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essential to Islam, because only with such freedom will
dispute and struggle possibly lead us to the best answers.
The idea of Islam weakening state authoritarianism is also shared by Oliver Roy,
who argues that totalitarianism seems to only rise in the Muslim world when society is in
shambles.84 Arguments that place Islam at the root of the Arab region’s failure to develop
regimes of good governance have not taken into account the fairly clear demands for
democratic and transparent governance which exist in the religion’s fundamental sources.
At a practical level, Islamic teachings, admittedly, have been used in condemnation of
Western notions of good governance. In the light of the above discussion however, it
seems, in fact, it is more likely that Islamic teachings are not the cause of authoritarian
ideologies, but are themselves often manipulated to grant legitimacy to regimes in order
to turn popular opinion against reform.
Arabic Cultural Norms and Good Governance
The concept of a cultural incompatibility that exists between the Arab region and
the principles of political reform is also extremely widespread and repeatedly based on
tenuous correlations and generalizations. One example of this is the repeated critical
examinations of early childhood education which is argued to be the root cause of
stagnated political cultures in the Arab Region. An example of this can be found in the
2003 Arab Human Development Report, which states most Arab children are exposed to
an authoritarian/overprotective style of child rearing, a philosophy which results in weak
decision making skills and passivity.85 Sociological evidence often leads to correlations

83 Kevin Dwyer, Arab Voices: The Human Rights Debate in the Middle East (Los Angeles: University o f
California Press, 1991), 216.
84 Roy, 9.
85 Kristen Helmore and Zahir Jamal, eds., Arab Human Development Report 2003: Building a Knowledge
Based Society (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2003), 51.
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between the childhood acceptance of the father’s dominance over the domestic household
•

and the later acceptance of an authoritarian state’s control over the public sphere.

86

In

essence, these arguments claim the socialization of Arab children creates a future adult
mentality in which the legitimacy of a staunchly vertical power structure is unquestioned.
Sociological evidence of Arab culture can, however, demonstrate strong
foundations for good governance principles. While discussing the textual sources for
authority within Islam, several references were made to the practice of shura or
consultation, an Arabic tribal construct which will now be explored in detail.

The

traditional Arab authority structure was not as vertically entrenched as often suggested.
Although staunchly patriarchal vertical units did exist, with bay’ah (homage) regularly
given to the sayyid (tribal chief), he did not have unlimited powers of authority. His
position would more accurately be described as a “first among equals” within his sphere
of influence, as other positions of authority, such as the hakam (wise man or tribal elders)
were often highly regarded.87 Within nomadic tribes, the tribal chief, called the Shaykh
al-Qabilah was elected based on what the community judged to be outstanding
characteristics such as bravery, generosity, modesty, eloquence, patience and clemency.88
There was therefore no divine or mystical rationale on which his position was founded.
Moreover, the sayyid did not make decisions independently, but through majority-rules
decisions of a tribal council which included family chiefs, soothsayers, poets and other
individuals judged to have outstanding leadership character.89 Many tribes gave every

86 Shrabi, 7.
87 Hamid Dabasi, Authority in Islam: From the Rise o f Muhammad to the Establishment o f the Umawads
(London: Transaction Publishers, 1989), 83, 91-92.
88 Mishal Fahm al Sulami, The West and Islam: Liberal Democracy vs. the System o f Shura (New York:
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 37-38.
89 Al Sulami, 38.
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person the right to speak so that transparency would allow inter-communal trust to
remain firm.90 Even after decisions were made, there was no executive authority to
enforce the decisions. Tribal authorities could only boycott and isolate those who refused
to obey their rulings.91
Settled communities, such as the trading centre Mecca, were also ruled by a tribal
council, which discussed wars, the annual pilgrimage (which pre-dates Islam) and civil
matters such as marriage and divorce. Other Arabian settlements, such as Saba (Sheba),
were monarchies, but with a rule that was far from absolute. In fact, decisions made by
the King of Saba needed to be approved by a Majlis al-Shura (consolation council) in
order to be enacted.92
Socially, according to W. Montgomery Watt, each mature male felt equal in
standing to the sayyid. The tribal chief, although in a position of esteem, could only
persuade his kinsman, not command them.93 Even in times of war and crisis, when
emergency authority was granted to the sayyid, a time limit would often be stipulated to
keep power from being centralized.94
Still, many critical sociological observations do indeed represent genuine cultural
constructs in the Arab region. Despite this however, it is unlikely that these are
responsible for political stagnation. The presence of patriarchal norms is in no way
exceptional to Arab culture and society and cultures with similar mentalities have
succeeded in establishing stable liberal democratic traditions throughout the 20th

90 Ibid., 38.
91 Ibid., 38.
92 Ibid., 39.
93 W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968), 40.
94 Watt, 40.
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Century.95

Moreover, in order to illustrate Arab exceptionalism towards good

governance, evidence would have to clearly demonstrate that such ideas were completely
alien to political discourse in Arabic cultures. This is clearly not the case, as historical
evidence shows that Arab society has repeatedly questioned the nature of government,
using language that strongly mirrors contemporary writing.

Once again, a thorough

overview of the literature would be tangential, and the following examples are meant
only to demonstrate that such a discourse was ongoing. One key example would be the
late 19th Century newspaper al-Jinan, founded by Butrus al-Bustani in 1870. In one
edition, al-Jinan describes the East as “once prosperous and civilized” but had now fallen
into a downward spiral of “bad government”. According to Bustani, the only remedy was
a regime of “good government” based on the principles of patriotism, education, division
of powers, an independent judiciary and separation of religion from state.96 Other
scholars, such as the 19th century al-Afghani, argued tirelessly against those who believed
Arabic culture and religion were not compatible with modem technology and political
reforms.97
The 2003 Freedom Survey in its attempts to gauge political values of different
cultures is further evidence against the idea of cultural exceptionalism. Results in the
Arab Region were strongly in favour of democratic reforms, with over seventy-five
percent of respondents listing greater political freedoms as an issue of primary concern.98
In fact, detailed questions on the survey gauged the Arab perception of various attributes
which make up a regime of good governance, finding little distinction between the values
95 An excellent example would be Japan, whose rigidly authoritarian society has maintained both
democracy and a highly competitive capitalist economy for over sixty years.
96 Hourani, 263.
97 Hourani, 272.
98 Brewka and Jamal, 97.
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of the Arab Region and other developing states. Patriarchal values may therefore have a
very strong place in Arabic society, but these values seem to hold little significant in the
Arab mind to questions of politics and good governance.
The above only discusses values of Arab society, and does not discount the
possibility that patriarchal relationships are at the core of Arab failure to achieve political
reform. In fact, evidence is extremely strong to suggest that a system of exchange and
constraint exist within most Arab states which maintain the elite’s power base."
Patriarchal relationships however, relate only to exchanges made between those sharing a
primordial link, such as those that exist between kinsmen.100 For much of the Arab
region, especially republics such as Syria and Egypt, this is not necessarily the case.
Evidence suggests a system which is much more pervasive, tying diverse groups together
within the state’s authoritative mechanisms. This is clearly the case within Egypt, whose
regime must maintain controls over a diverse ethnic and religious population.

This

ability to cross primordial barriers calls into question the power of patriarchy and would
instead suggest an entrenched patron-client relationship of control.101

While this

difference between a clientelist system and a patriarchal one may seem of little
consequence, it removes the idea that the cause of political stagnation is one of culture or
religion. This assertion is supported by research which has identified dynamics of
clientelism all over the world, providing a theoretical framework in which arguments of
“culturally based irrationality” are undermined.

109

This is especially important for the

purposes of this study, as it provides a theoretical basis on which to examine political
99 Once again, this will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.
100 Peter Flynn, “Class, Clientelism and Coercion: Some Mechanisms o f Internal Dependency and Control,”
Journal o f Commonwealth and Comparative Politics Vol. 2 Issue 2: 135.
101 Schmidt et al., xxxv.
102 Kaufman, 285.
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constructs in the Arab region as a series of rationally constructed exchanges between the
regime and various non-state political actors.
Clientelism
Outlining what is actually meant by the term ‘clientelism” will now monopolize
the remainder of this chapter, as the literature on the phenomenon is quite extensive. As
mentioned in the introduction, the theoretical framework behind patron-client theory
developed in the 1940s with a series of anthropological and sociological studies on the
nature of inter-personal relationships.103 It was only in the 1970s that serious attention
was given to this phenomenon in the wider social sciences.104 Essentially, patron-client
theory discusses a reality in which a personalized and reciprocal relationship between an
inferior and a superior party develops on the basis of creating a mutually beneficial
relationship.105 Key to this definition is the idea of the asymmetrical nature of this
relationship, in which one party has much greater control over the allocation of power
and resources. If the client gains too much strength, the system collapses.106 Unlike
other exchanges, clientelism is never fully legitimized, remaining always in someway an
informal and voluntary agreement.

107

Dyadic clientelist relations are the base level in which this phenomenon exits.
That said, dyadic exchanges come in various forms, many of which are not clientelist.
For instance, dyadic relationships can exist at the horizontal level, consisting of mutual
exchanges of resources between actors of the same level. Typically these dyads form
when actors at the same societal level provide different resources to the relationship,
103 Eisenstaat and Roniger, Patrons. Clients and Friends. 3.
104 Roniger and Gunes-Ayata, 3.
105 Lemarchand and Lagg, 151.
106 Kaufman, 285.
107 Roniger and Gunes-Ayata, 4.

32

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

resulting in equal benefit to both.108 These exchanges allow both actors to obtain
resources at lower cost than can otherwise be secured ad hoc in the market place.109
Since there is no clear hierarchy between the actors, this relationship can not be
considered clientelist, a phenomenon which demands a clear power asymmetry.110
The same is true of dyadic exchanges that happen within primordial units such as
the family or tribe. Here, the exchange of resources may be linked to social motivations
which ignore reciprocal demands. Clientelist interactions however, must consist of an
exchange which has been determined by the more powerful of the two participants.111
Within a society, dyads eventually form chains and finally pyramid structures in
which regional patrons provide services for multiple local clients.

112

While many of these

processes could be carried out by primordial groups, that is not always necessarily the
case. In traditional societies, relations between a landlord and local peasants, common
throughout Europe and other agrarian cultures, marks the most easily observable
examples of non-primordial interactions.113
One of the strengths of clientelist theory was the theoretical understanding that the
phenomenon evolves along side a country’s economic development.114 Where as
patriarchal ties are predominant between actors within traditional societies, clientelism
continues to evolve along with a modernizing society, becoming a phenomenon based on
“formalized general exchange” on an institutionalized level.115

New patron-client

108 S ch m id t e t al., x iv -x v .

109 Ibid., xv.
110 Lemarchand and Lagg, 151
111 Eisenstadt and Roniger, Patrons. Clients and Friends. 48.
112 Christopher Clapham ed., Private Patronage and Public Power: Political Clientelism in the Modem State
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), 6.
113 Clapham, 2.
114 Roniger and Gunes-Ayata, 12.
115 Eisenstadt and Roniger, Patrons. Clients and Friends. 37, 227.
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identities are formed as personal relationships are replaced by institutional ones such as
union or party membership.116 According to Eisenstadt and Roniger, “instead of limited,
direct personal relations to one patron, more complicated networks of patrons, brokers
and clients emerge. These are often organized pyramidally, consisting of chains that may
run right through the administration.”117 This industrialized clientelism sees local strong
men become merely a chain linking the periphery to politicians and administrators who
often use “their positions to build a personal following and [to] gain access to official
positions in the administration, then wield the resources and services controlled by their
incumbency to expand their clientelist network.”118
Brokers and middle men will always represent a challenge to the patron as they
themselves press to control relations with the client.119 As power becomes centralized
however, the patron institution (usually the government itself at this stage), will seek to
create direct links with the periphery.120 This allows the regime to have greater autonomy
while reducing the power of rival bases within the system. This can be done using party
officials and bureaucratic institutions which become strong enough to link the core to the
periphery. By frustrating the advancement of brokers, regimes create a system by which
the only way to advance is to please the patron directly and without the filter of a
broker’s demands. This also allows the regime more freedom to focus the attention of
their different clients by creating a sense of rivalry between them.

This undermines

horizontal solidarity between groups that may otherwise join together.121 For the most

116 Roniger and Gunes-Ayata, 22.
117 Eisenstadt and Roniger, Patrons. Clients and Friends. 228.
118 Roniger and Gunes-Ayata, 11-12.
119 Eisenstaat and Roniger, Patrons. Clients and Friends. 244.
120 Schmidt et al., 326.
121 S.N. Eisenstadt and Rene Lemarchand, Political Clientelism: Patronage and Development (Beverly
Hills: Sage Publications, 1981), 276.
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part, such a transition is essential to maintaining stability in the system, as the modem
age opens up a wealth of information to the periphery, allowing clients to compare
patrons and withdraw support if they find an exchange which is better suited to them.122
If the patron bypasses the broker, they can deal directly with weaker elements of society
which may be co-opted with fewer resources.

The greater the power difference is

between patron and client, the more the weaker actor will have no choice but to remain in
the relationship or loose the ability to access the basic resources needed for survival.123
Key to this development is the system of controls a patron can place over political
or economic power.124 Control of the political system is perhaps the most common way
of achieving this, since a patron-regime has the mechanisms of the state to provide the
process with greater legitimacy. Challengers to the patron now can be met with various
constitutional restraints. Although the patron-client relationship remains technically
informal, legal realities are often introduced to tacitly institutionalize the exchange.125 In
fact, according to Robert R. Kaufman, ideas that clientelism exists in societies with weak
legal foundations is fallacious, as the phenomenon is often indirectly facilitated within a
strict legal framework.

iv

As a patron (again, usually a government regime) obtains

hegemonic control over resources and political power and sets up institutional framework
to entrench the clientelist exchange, an “encapsulated society” forms and infiltrates all
facets of activity.

127

Overtime, the affected society may loose the “ethic of public

122 Eisenstadt and Lemarchand, 40.
123 Schmidt et al., 131.
124 These systems o f control will be discussed with regards to Egypt in the following chapter.
125 Lemarchand and Lagg, 153.
126 Kaufman, 294.
127 Clapham, 9.
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allocation” and see clientelist interactions as the only legitimate way to access
resources. 128
This study will attempt to link the above phenomenon to the failure of Egypt to
develop democratic institutions in which the Copts can participate. Within the Egyptian
system itself, several strategic clientelist relationships have been developed to reward
acceptance of the status-quo and weaken those who challenge it.

This essentially

establishes an intractable reality in which little can be accomplished without the regime’s
approval.
Now that clientelism has been selected as a base for the following study, some
attention has to be given to what critics have described as the theory’s weakness. From a
sociology standpoint, clientelism has been criticised for its assumption of a harmonized
society, as there seems to be little discussion of conflict between actors within the
paradigm.129 In the case of the Copts in Egypt, conflict most certainly exists between the
community as a whole and other groups within Egyptian society.
however, this conflict is latent, suppressed by the clientelist system.

For the most part
In the cases of

manifest conflict which will be discussed in Chapter Four, it will be demonstrated that
the modem outbreaks of violence usually occur within the periphery of Egyptian society.
Conflict between the patron regime and the client Church however, has not become
manifest since the establishment of a clientelist relationship. This is not because conflict
disappears, but instead is because positive reciprocity provides a stabilizing function

1TO

which keeps conflict suppressed.

128 Clapham, 8.
129 Eisenstadt and Lemarchand, 9.
130 Schmidt et al., 39.

36

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

Other criticisms state that the clientelist paradigm is reductionist in nature,
narrowing all interactions into one unified category.131 Within this study however, no
claim has been made to suggest that all interactions exist within the clientelist framework,
only that this paradigm is an alternative and useful way to describe the system of
exchanges which concern Coptic political participation.

131 Eisenstadt and Lemarchand, 11.
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C h a p t e r T h r e e : C l ie n t e l is m

and

Control

in t h e

E g y p t ia n S y s t e m

Now that clientelism has been discussed in theory, focus will shift in this chapter
towards examining the process in which the phenomenon has manifested itself within the
country’s political system. During the 19th and early 20th Centuries, British rule over
Egypt precipitated a strong shift in governance styles from what existed under the
Ottoman Empire. Whereas the Turks had slowly granted Egypt increasing sovereignty
over its own affairs, Britain centralized authority in the hands of its military governors.
During the Great War, measures were introduced to redesign the Egyptian economy to
serve the British war effort, while martial law eliminated a range of civil rights such as
the freedoms of speech and assembly.

These draconian policies drastically altered the

nature of Egyptian political discourse, shifting it from a liberal ideological focus to a
nationalist one. Joining in a united front against the British presence, both Christian and
Muslim elites formed the Wafd party on the basis of creating a free and independent
Egypt.

1TT

British attempts to undermine the party with the help of the Egyptian monarchy

only fuelled the nationalist cause, as Sa’ad Zaghlul, the leader of the Wafd, became an
anti-imperialist hero in the minds of many Egyptians.134
The colonial period therefore significantly changed the direction of Egyptian
political discourse from one that focused on liberalism and the weakening of executive
power to a centralized, ideologically based front against colonialism. The nationalist
movement also relied heavily on the individual popularity of leaders like Sa’ad Zaghlul.
Whereas before, 19th century intellectuals like al-Afghani and his disciples represented an

132 John Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800-1956 (London: Frank Cass and Company Ltd, 1965),
219.
133 Solihin, 7.
134 Marlowe, 275.
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indigenous push for an increasingly critical Egyptian populous, the nationalist movement
gained political currency by focusing the attention of the country completely on their
promise to eliminate the foreign threat.135 This ideology would centre on the idea of a
strong charismatic leader who would be essential to the battle against imperialist
interference. When the Free Officer’s Revolution was successful, the growing popularity
for a strong personal authority figure was cemented in a new charismatic autocrat who
would win self-determination for Egyptians. According to Claude Ake, this phenomenon
is not unusual, as charismatic leadership is a key characteristic in the transitional periods
•

•

•

•

•

of several post-colonial states as the country frees itself from imperial domination.

1^

Both Zaghlul and Nasser would fill this role in the Egyptian political environment,
shifting the direction of political discourse.
Clientelism Under Nasser
This charismatic authority would eventually evolve into the ideological
cornerstone of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s presidency. Despite achieving independence from
British interference, Nasser would insist that foreign control over key assets like the Suez
Canal and the country’s agricultural land represented a new front for the Egyptian
nationalist struggle.137 The president’s strong charisma further entrenched the public’s
conception that the political environment demanded centralized authority in a strong
leader, and Nasser would waste no time declaring a single national party to push forward
the revolutionary changes would characterize his rule.

I <30

Hourani, 272.
136 Claude Ake, A Theory o f Political Integration (Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1967), 52.
l37Kassem, 13.
138 Ibid., 51.
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Charismatic rule begins to degrade slowly after independence in all post colonial
states, and new structures of authority must to be built in order to maintain the autocratic
structures created by the anti-colonial struggle.

1 "30

One of the most effective foundation to

maintain control of the political sphere is the patron-client system. This was the case in
Egypt, as a key clientelist bond was formed between the ruling party and the lower
classes. Like many leaders in the developing world, Nasser harnessed working class
frustration over land issues as part of his basis for his legitimacy.140 This allowed him to
distract attention once more from questions over his regime’s lack of democracy through
efforts to economically co-opt the population through land re-distribution laws (Before
Nasser, the upper class held over 50% of agrarian land141). The expanding bureaucracy
of the state and the focus on socialism allowed Nasser to bypass the traditional brokers of
Egyptian society or futuwawat (typically local neighbourhood strongmen), and create a
direct connection between the core and periphery.142
Another example of Nasser’s clientelist control can be examined via the state’s
relationship with Al-Azhar University. One of the most respected Islamic institutions in
the Sunni Muslim world, Al-Azhar was virtually incorporated as “an arm of the state”.143
Older scholars were replaced by new ones trained during Nasser’s presidency as state
funding increased the University’s budget four fold.144 Not surprisingly, religious
rulings, or fatwas, began to consistently appear in support of the ruling parties policies.

140 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egypt. Islam and Democracy (Cairo: The American University o f Cairo, 1996;
reprint, 2002), 109.
141 Ibrahim, Egypt. Islam and Democracy. 112.
142 Eisenstadt and Roniger, Patrons. Clients and Friends. 133.
143 Tamir Moustafa, “Conflict and Cooperation between the State and Religious Institutions in
Contemporary Egypt,” International Journal o f Middle East Studies Vol. 32, N o.l (Feb., 2000): 3.
144 Moustafa, 6.
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This was critically important, particularly as Nasser became increasingly criticized by
Islamists in Saudi Arabia.145
Nasser’s death after decades of rule raised questions over the future of the
country’s political direction. The clientelist authoritarian system, which owed its legacy
and legitimized on Nasser’s personal popularity now seemed uncertain to survive under
Vice President Anwar Sadat.
Clientelism Under Sadat
The survival of state authoritarianism required Sadat’s clientelist foundation to
break away from Nasser’s in order to cement his own legitimacy.

Starting with the

undermining of political rivals like Ali Sabri and Muhammad Fawzi146, Sadat moved
quickly to establish a new support base that would be loyal to his rule and not that of the
late president.147

In order to establish his legitimacy, Sadat moved to establish new

patron-client relationships by becoming allies with Nasser’s arch-rivals, the Muslim
Brotherhood. Soon Sadat freed hundreds of Islamists from prison and began to establish
himself as “the Believer President” of an Islamic society.148 Further measures ordered
three thousand hours of state television to be dedicated to Islamic programming in
attempt to further co-opt Muslim religious groups.149 Using Islam as an ideological
foundation for legitimacy also allowed Sadat to later undermine secular opposition
groups, especially the socialist Tagammu party, which Sadat continually accused of being
communist agents of the Soviet Union.150 Since criticizing Islam would result in political

145 Ibid., 7.
146 Both Sabri and Fawzi were members o f the military and close allies o f President Nasser. It quickly
became clear their loyalty did not extend to the new president.
147 Kassem, 21.
148 Shatzmiller, 29.
149 Shatzmiller, 37.
150 Ibrahim, Egypt. Islam and Democracy. 46.
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suicide, many of these groups found they could not compete with the regime for political
space.151 Sadat also pushed to gain outside support by pursuing policies which would
legitimize his presidency with the West, such as expelling Soviet advisors in 1972,
opening up the Egyptian economy in 1974, and beginning negotiations with Israel in
1977.152
Clientelism Under Mubarak
Hosni Mubarak would enjoy an Egyptian political culture which had now largely
accepted an authoritarian executive and the patron-client system as a political norm. That
said, challenges still existed to the authoritarian structure. In his first term, Mubarak was
confronted by a new multi-party system (which Sadat had introduced in 1977) and
growing demands for change.

In order to counter any challenges to his legitimacy,

Mubarak made sweeping promises of political reform in 1984, including the pledge to
stay in office for only two terms.

1ST

Once his patron-client network was established

however, Mubarak’s message soon shifted, arguing that democracy in the country would
have to come in stages proportional to what Egyptians could absorb.154
The Mubarak regime also made strong use of their secular identity to maintain
popularity.

This major change from Sadat was the result of increasing violence

perpetrated by radical Islamists groups which had broken away from the Brotherhood and
began attacking state security forces, tourists and Egyptian Christians.155 After attacks on
tourists saw the Egyptian economy lose over three billion dollars annually, Mubarak was

151 In the modem context, Islam continues to represent a hegemonic political symbol. Today however, the
Islamic political identity is monopolized by the Muslim Brotherhood and not the ruling party. This is an
important reason why the Brotherhood is so effective at surviving Mubarak’s attempts to undermine them.
152 Kassem, 23.
153 Ibid., 27.
154 Ibid., 79.
155 Ibrahim, Egypt. Islam and Democracy. 70.
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able to raise his popularity (and delay democratization indefinitely) under the guise of
fighting a war against Islamic extremism.156 September 11th, 2001, allowed Mubarak to
use this justification on more than the Egyptian populace, as the United States and other
Western countries became quick to accept the regime’s claims that exceptional measures
were needed to fight the War on Terrorism.157 Moreover, the regime has used fear of an
extremist Islamic regime coming to power to convince many in Egypt, particularly
Coptic Christians to support the proverbial ‘devil they know’ rather than tempt a shift to
the status quo.158 In this way, Mubarak pushed to create his own ideological image as the
secular, moderate strongman that stands firmly between the Egyptian people and Islamic
radicalism.
Tactical Clientelism Within the Egyptian System

Now that the historical development and political ramifications of the patronclient system in Egypt have been established, focus will shift to describe the specific
powers that the government has formed in order to monopolize control over Egypt’s
political sphere.

These controls will be broken down into several key areas which the

ruling party uses to systematically reward clients and frustrate opposition.
The ruling party has used the clientelist system repeatedly to undermine its
opposition.

According to the Ibn Khaldun Center, Egypt has the most developed

institutional infrastructure in the Arab world, one that is capable of sustaining full
democracy.159 Many Egyptians however, choose to support the ruling National
Democratic Party in order to access resources and build up their communities. This was

156 Ibid., 79.
157 Helmore and Jamal, 1.
158 Brewka and Jamal, 12.
159 Zaki, 23.
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a critical element in the 2000 parliamentary elections, as politicians needed to win voter
trust in order to gain critical village loyalties for their campaigns.160 This focus on
developing clientelist relationships with voters has had a degrading effect on debate
within the National Assembly, as Egyptian political activity has begun to rotate entirely
around politicians who endlessly seek to secure narrow campaign promises made to
powerful individual supporters.161 In this type of relationship, the ruling party will have a
decisive advantage over the opposition, as it alone has access to state resources and the
ability to make credible promises. Once their patron has fulfilled their promises, the
various authority groups, whether they be the primordial family or clan, business or
religious authority, will not only accept their patron’s authority, but also work to make
sure everyone under their own control gives allegiance to their new patron. According to
Maye Kassem the clientelist bond “binds leaders and followers in a relationship not only
of mutual assistance and support, but also recognized and accepted inequality between
big men and lesser m en...”

The executive and the ruling NDP party therefore is able

to establish its authority through the creation of these clientelist relationships which
establish vertical power structures that permeate all levels of society.
The establishment of patron-client relations is therefore a key foundation of
Egyptian authoritarian rule. By co-opting key support bases, the regime is able to tie its
survival to its supporter’s advancement, giving them a personal stake in maintaining the
status-quo. Even Egyptian political culture is shaped to depend on the ruling party’s
continuing domination, as various authority groups within society conclude the only way
to access state resources is through supporting the NDP.
160 Makram-Ebeid, 41.
161 Ouda, al-Borai and Abu Se’ada, 56.
162 Kassem, 4.
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Constitutional Control
Constitutional change has been used since the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser
to legitimize the executive’s political platform.163 Post-revolutionary Egypt has seen no
less than seven constitutions, each often radically altering the political landscape of the
country.

For example, the 1958 Constitution eliminated parliament to prepare for

Egypt’s short-lived union with Syria, while the 1964 document ordered half the seats in
subsequent parliaments to be filled with “workers and peasants” to increase the chance of
election victories for loyal civil servants.164 The current constitution was proclaimed on
September 11th, 1971 and denotes considerable space laying out extraordinary control the
executive authority enjoys over the state.165 An overview of the Constitution makes this
imbalance clear, as sixty-three percent of powers are given to the presidency, while only
twenty-five percent are awarded to the legislature and only two percent for the judiciary
and cabinet respectively.166 Article 5 of the Constitution, designed to outline the balance
of power between the branches of the state clearly illustrates the significant powers of the
executive.167 They include, according to Article 112 and Article 147, the right of the
executive to create and revoke legislation168, draft the state budget and unilaterally
declare a state of emergency.169 The latter right was exercised in 1981 shortly after the
assassination of President Anwar Sadat and has been used to increase executive authority

163 Ibid., 17.
164 Ibid., 18. Although argued to be an expression o f socialism, the idea o f guaranteeing “workers” in
parliament was always problematic, if not entirely disingenuous. The definition o f “worker” was designed
to maximize the amount o f Presidential supporters in parliament.
165 Ouda, al-Borai and Abu Se’ada, 19.
166 Negad al-Borai, The Independence o f the Judiciary: The Truth As it Is! [research paper online] (Cairo:
United Group, accessed 30 Dec. 2005); available from http://www.ug-law.com/eng/unitedgroup-post.pdf,
8.

167 Ouda, al-Borai and Abu Se’ada, 19.
168 Ibid., 20.
169 Kassem, 24.
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ever since. These emergency laws are not only seen in Egypt but throughout the Arab
world, and are a major criticism of the 2004 Arab Human Development Report.170 In
Egypt, these measures include and are not limited to, restrictions on freedoms of
mobility, assembly and residence, the increase of police search and arrest powers as well
as the ability to bypass normal criminal courts.171 Furthermore, the emergency laws
stipulate that the country’s opposition parties must provide notice of all activities to the
Ministry of Interior, allowing the ruling NDP to interfere and disrupt campaign and
organizing efforts.172 Finally, Egypt’s emergency laws also allow the president to arrest
individuals without charge and hold them for forty-five days (this can be extended
indefinitely173), a tactic used against many of Egypt’s estimated 12,000 to 15,000
political prisoners.174
The executive’s control over the state is therefore legitimized in the nation’s basic
law, protecting it from open legal challenges. Even more important however, it allows
the executive multiple fronts on which to frustrate challengers, as opposition parties and
even members of the other branches of government are faced with the realization that
political change can rarely occur legally outside the approval of the president.
Furthermore, no concrete steps have been taken by President Mubarak to fulfill his
campaign pledge to end the use of the country’s emergency laws (renewed shortly before
the 2005 election), a reform that would be tenuous at best, due to the President’s ability
to renew the state of emergency at will.

170 Brewka and Jamal, 15.
171 Ouda, al-Borai and Abu Se’ada, 36.
172 Kassem, 56.
173 Ibid., 37.
174 Ibid., 37.

46

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

At least on one occasion, the executive has offered amendments to the
constitution in order to appease its political clients. In 1971, President Anwar Sadat
approved a motion to declare Islamic Shari 'ah “a” source of law in the Republic. Later
in 1980, this article was amended again to state that Shari’ah would be “the” source of
law for the constitution, further amassing the support of Islamists.175 Clearly however,
this was an empty gesture on behalf of the state, as attempts by judges to use Shari ’ah in
rulings have lead to their dismissal.176

Still, the ability to entice support through

amendments to the country’s highest law is a key power of the executive.
Judicial and Parliamentary Controls
The constitutional powers granted to the executive allow it to control and
influence much of the activities of the other two branches of the state. The executive’s
influence then ties both branches into a reality in which they are politically or financially
rewarded for supporting the status quo.
The President’s control over the parliament begins with the ability to directly
appoint representatives to both houses of the Assembly. In the Maglis al-Sha’ab this
only accounts for ten members, but the upper house (Maglis al-Shurah) presidential
supporters receive a full one-third of the seats automatically.177 This creates a substantial
bloc of parliamentarians whose political career rests entirely on supporting the
executive’s policies.

The President also controls the parliament with his ability to call

the assembly to order and send it to recess at will. The parliament therefore can only
meet at the pleasure of the executive branch, and cannot meet without its approval.178

175 Shatzmiller, 72.
176 Sami Zubaida, Law and Power in the Islamic World. (New York: I.B. Tarns, 2003; reprint, 2005), 170.
177 Ouda, al-Borai and Abu Se’ada,, 20.
178 al-Borai, The Independence o f the Judiciary. 6.
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The executive also creates the state budget, which the parliament (under Article 15 of the
■I 7 Q

Constitution) is not allowed to amend without Presidential permission.

Unilateral

control of the state’s budget gives the executive extraordinary power over the other
branches, giving the president control over financial incentives which can used to co-opt
various support bases, such as the military and the judiciary.180
The President’s NDP party has enjoyed, since the introduction of the multi-party
system in 1977, a complete domination of the legislature. This is in large part due to the
fact that the National Democratic Party has access to state resources in order to frustrate
the opposition.181 Whereas the opposition parties find their political organization efforts
hampered by the Ministry of the Interior, the NDP is free to promote its campaigns at
will.182 In 1995, the popular (but officially banned) Muslim Brotherhood was only able to
win one seat in parliament due to extreme state interference.

Furthermore, access to

state political/economic resources as well as contact with the executive allows individual
NDP candidates the ability to make credible patrimonial promises to their supporters.184
Perhaps the most striking aspect of parliamentary dynamics in Egypt is that any
critical remarks against the executive are technically illegal under Articles 98b, 102b and
174 of the Penal Code.

Such laws, strictly speaking, outlaw all political discourse

which does not support the ruling party and can be used to quell opposition dissent in the
parliament if necessary. Members of Parliament do enjoy legal protections, but immunity
can be removed if the majority of the People’s Assembly vote in favour of the motion.

179 Ibid, 7.
180 The regimes relationship with both the judiciary and military will be examined later in this paper.
181 Makram-Ebeid, 33.
182 Kassem, 56.
183 Makram-Ebeid, 35.
184 Kassem, 56.
185 Ibid, 57.
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Since the ruling NDP has held the overwhelming majority in parliament since the current
multi-party system was established, this gives them a key weapon against political
opponents. Such was the case when Islamist MP Sayid Fath al-Bab was stripped of his
protections because of his work against the NDP in the lower house.

186

It is clear therefore that the state’s interference in the legislative process creates a
system in which opposition parties are powerless to gain political goals.187 While the
ruling NDP party has no trouble finding candidates to run in all districts, most secular
parties are unable to develop the manpower to ever seriously challenge the regime’s
majority. This is because running for the ruling party often results in access to state
resources; whereas running for the opposition is largely pursued for ideological purposes
and lacks opportunities for economic and professional advancement.
The judiciary also lacks independence from the executive, despite the claim by
the Constitution (Article 165, 166) of a strong separation of powers .188 First, the judicial
authority is divided among several institutions, forcing power to be dispersed, rather than
concentrated in the hands of a traditional judicial structure. The first parallel institution
created by the executive for this purpose was the State Security Court, formed in 1964.

180

These emergency courts, found all over the Arab region, are not only used to try those
accused of military crimes, but also for civilian offenders.190

In Egypt, these special

courts (legalized by Article 170 and 173 of the constitution191), began to charge political

186 Ibid., 32.
187 This generally is the case for the secular opposition, but political efforts by the Muslim Brotherhood can
also be frustrated through state security systems.
188 Ouda, al-Borai and Abu S e’ada, 26.
189 Kassem, 19.
190 Brewka and Jamal, 91.
191 Ouda, 26.
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and Islamist opponents in 1992 and civilian offenders in 1995.192 Therefore, unlike
military courts in the West, the regime can opt to bypass the normal judiciary and
prosecute civilian defendants and in a court controlled by military officers.
In 1969, the second parallel judiciary was created in order to strengthen Nasser’s
legitimacy after his defeat to the Israelis in the Six Days War.193 The Supreme
Constitutional Court is, technically speaking, the most senior court in the country, but
legal analysts argue that the constitution remains very vague as to whether it is part of the
normal judiciary or not.194

If it remains outside of the normal judiciary, then

constitutional protections regarding separation of powers do not apply. What is clear
however, is that protections or not, the executive does control the SCC and its decisions.
Each member is chosen by the executive, and the President himself has no restrictions on
the choice of his appointee, making a promotion to the SCC a supreme act of patronage
from the president to his closest supporters.195
The dominance of the regime over the SCC was clearly demonstrated when the
Court finally ruled in 2000 on a ten year old case challenging the executive’s supervision
of polling stations during national elections. The court ruled against the executive, but
only because the President gave them permission to do so in an attempt to shore up his
legitimacy after criticisms of the 1995 election.196 The fact that the executive can freeze a
controversial ruling for ten years is testament to the reality that the SCC remains ready to
carry out the task that it was created for, namely, the implement of the regime’s policies
in a manner which builds legitimacy in the eyes of the Egyptian people.
192 Ibid., 25.
193 Kassem, 19.
194 Ouda, al-Borai and Abu S e’ada, 27.
195 al-Borai, The Independence o f the Judiciary. 16.
196 Ouda, al-Borai and Abu Se’ada, 31.
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Finally, the president also has power over the traditional judiciary as well, both by
controlling their selection and the treasury from which their salaries are paid197 (the
President also has the power to appoint and promote all of the country’s Public
| QO

Prosecutors, giving the executive even more control over the legal system

). Moreover,

according to Law 46 of 1972, the Ministry of Justice has the right to supervise the
activities of all judges.199 From this, it controls the promotion and disciplinary actions
which it can carry out unilaterally. For instance, laws enacted in 1972 and 1974 allow the
executive to promote a judge to a higher circuit for as long as they deem necessary (in
renewable six month terms).200 This tactic can also be used for the Public Prosecutors
and creates a system by which the person in question remains permanently co-opted by
the state. At any time the executive can demote the judge/lawyer back to his previous
position, forcing the individual to continually seek to carry out the will of the regime.
These temporary posts can be extremely lucrative, adding a powerful financial incentive
to comply.201
The Ministry o f Justice also controls the Judicial Inspectors Directorate, which is
charged with disciplining and dismissing judges that are unfit for duty.202 This, like
many other powers given to the executive, lacks safeguards to prevent it from being
abused for political purposes.

For instance, the Minister of Justice has the right to

dismiss a judge for health reasons that compromise his ability to carry out his duties.
This decision however, does not require confirmation by any medical institution.203

197 Ibid., 26.
198 al-Borai, The Independence o f the Judiciary. 24.
199 Ibid., 2.
200 Ibid., 28.
201 Ibid., 39.
202 Ibid., 35.
203 Ibid., 33.
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Moreover, Article 111 of Law 46 (1972) also allows the Ministry to dismiss any judge
that is unfit for his position, offering the executive limitless excuses to remove judges
that challenge their authority.204
The control over the parliament and judiciary adds further legal barriers to
political change, as the executive works to create a system in which professional success
in these institutions is tied directly to maintaining the status-quo.

Challenging the

government in any meaningful way would result in, at best, the closing of lucrative
financial opportunities and an end to professional advancement. Serious challenges may
very well result in disciplinary issues which can end a career outright.
Economic Control
Another effective tool in establishing state autonomy and authority is found in
Egypt’s economic polices. One of the fundamental controls most citizens have over their
state is the government’s reliance on taxation as a source of income. Compared to most
developing countries however, Egypt relies disproportionately on external rents, allowing
them to have greater economic autonomy from their citizenry.205 While the idea of rent
traditionally is seen as a major factor only in the Gulf States, Egypt has its own major
sources of rent, including oil, tourism, Suez Canal income, workers’ remittances and
foreign aid. These sources of income by 1980 accounted for twenty-four percent of the
country’s wealth, giving the state extraordinary autonomy from its citizens.206

1 U 1 U ,5 J

'•

205 Richards and Waterbury, 17.
206 Paul Rivlin, “Egypt’s Demographic Challenges,” Middle East Review o f International Affairs Volume
7, No. 4 (December 2003) [journal online] accessed on 1 January 2006, available from
http://meria.idc.ac.il/joumal/2003/issue4/jv7n4a2.html.
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Government spending during the Post-Revolutionary period also drastically
•

increased, from 18.5 percent of the country’s GDP in 1954 to 55.7 percent in 1970.

907

Due to the constitutional controls the executive has over the state, the President continues
to enjoy almost complete control over the distribution of this wealth.

2QO

.

This

monopolization of the state’s resources by the executive easily leads to corruption as the
ruling party, unchecked, uses this wealth as tools for political patronage.209 Moreover,
instead of using this income for structural reform programs, Egypt, like most Arab
regimes, often spent the funds on grand public or social works projects in order to gain
legitimacy from its citizens 210 Although key reforms were carried out during the 1990s,
they were aided by massive debt relief given to Egypt as reward for its support during the
Gulf War. For example, Egyptian political and military co-operation lead to pressure by
America and several Gulf states on various institutions, causing many to forgive their
loans. The Paris Club alone wrote off over 10.1 billion dollars of the Egyptian debt,
making reforms much more manageable211 Despite this unprecedented assistance,
Mubarak still remained cautious with serious economic reform, because structural
readjustment would lead to a serious challenge of his presidency.

919

In fact, the early

nineties (when initial economic reforms were being taken), were some of the bloodiest in
Egyptian history, with over 1,000 deaths.213 The violence was rooted in the disruption of

207 Owen, 24.
208 Eberhard Kienle, A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt (New York: I.B.
Tauris Publishers, 2001), 24.
209 Celasun, xvii.
210 Richards and Waterbury, 214.
211 Rivlin, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2003/issue4/jv7n4a2.html.
212 The Brotherhood found increasing support amongst the lower class as state subsidies weakened.
213 Ibrahim, Egypt. Islam and Democracy. 168.
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what Maye Kassem describes as the authoritarian “social contract” in which the state
provides economic rights in return for worker class submission.214
State interference in the economy can also be felt in the massive state-owned
enterprises which are found throughout Egypt. Through these corporations, authoritarian
states can maintain control over their populations who now rely on the state, and not the
private sector, for employment and basic services. This massive interference in economy
has made the state completely indispensable, giving millions of people a direct economic
interest in maintaining the political status quo.215
In all, the government of Egypt provides work for over twenty-five million people
(35 percent of the population) through the civil service and various state owned
enterprises. Moreover, SOEs, even after initial privatization efforts, still account for sixty
percent of non-agricultural output.216 Controlling these industries is essential to
maintaining authoritarian power, as any disintegration of Egyptian financial realities
would result in widespread discontent and serious challenges to the regime’s authority.
The monopolization of the workforce by the state occurred shortly after
independence, as the government set wages without reference to the private sector,
attracting the most skilled workers to its industries.217 This policy was so successful that
the decade after the revolution saw the bureaucracy grow from 350,000 workers to over
one million.

110

By drawing the best professional minds away from the private sector, the

Egyptian state was able to greatly increase in political authority and economic autonomy.

214 Kassem, 13.
215 Celasun, 26.
216 Ibid., 65.
217 Ibid., 70.
218 Owen, 24.
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The government presence in the workforce also increased as state institutions
have made a concerted effort to lower unemployment by unnecessarily increasing the size
of bureaucracy and SOEs. Besides being economically unsound, these programs make
efforts to privatize companies (300 companies in 1991)

910

extremely difficult, as

responsible down-sizing often leads to unemployment and the types of violence
mentioned above.220
The economic foundation of Egyptian authoritarianism is absolutely critical to the
regime’s ability to monopolize the state’s political sphere. Mubarak’s tentativeness to
continue the reforms which started in the early 1990s demonstrates a clear choice to
continue the pursuit of personal power over the wellbeing of the Egyptian economy.
That said, until those consequences manifest themselves, Mubarak and the NDP continue
to maintain control of state resources and businesses, forcing Egyptians to have a
powerful economic stake in the status quo.
Control over Civil Society
One of the strongest challenges to the ruling party has been Egyptian civil society.
According to most experts, civil society challenges the authoritarian system because it
consists of a plurality of actors each vying for their particular interests and place in the
country’s political sphere.

Civil society in Egypt has done much to disintegrate the

parochial political culture within the country’s society that the regime relies upon to
continue its patriarchal role.
The executive authority has typically challenged the growth of civil society by
passing laws which tie its existence to ministries within the government. This was the
219 Ibrahim, Egypt. Islam and Democracy. 150.
220 The violence stems not merely from workers being unemployed, but also because o f ideas that
guaranteed employment is part o f the patron-client relationship with the state.
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case with Nasser, whose presidency was threatened early on by the growing power of
unions and labour groups within the country.

To combat this, the executive passed

legislation (Law 32 of 1964) which allowed the government to dissolve any association
001
which was not in line with “security measures”.
Further labour laws attempted to
appease unions by pledging no dismissal without cause if unions did not engage in
strikes. Failure to accept this bargain was met with a swift military response, as a 1953
strike in Imbaba lead to 300 arrests as tanks and soldiers moved to end the standoff.

000

Over time, Nasser began to deal with this problem by integrating the unions into
the state apparatus.

This was accomplished through the creation of the General

Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions, a government umbrella association which would
safeguard workers rights.223 This would allow the government to again have direct
control over the various emerging labour groups.
Although human rights groups, such as the Partisan’s Association of Human
Rights in Cairo/Alexandria developed during the 1970s, they simply acted as
mouthpieces of government propaganda.

It was not until 1987 that the Egyptian

Organization for Human Rights became the country’s first independent NGO dedicated
to monitoring state abuses of human rights. The work of the EOHR has done much to
gain the disapproval of the regime which has never formally recognized the
association.224 Although remaining outside the law allows the association more freedom
from state control, it leaves it vulnerable to stiff legal penalties which the government can
apply at will.

221 Kassem, 88.
222 Ibid., 90.
223 Ibid., 92.
224 Ibid., 119.
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In 2003 the government implemented a new Associations Law (Law 84 of 2002)
which maintains the government’s control over NGOs and civil society groups. The law
forces the review of NGO registration by the Ministry of the Interior and security services
•

•

•

and allows the President to dissolve any association at will by administrative order.

225

The law also allows the government authority over who sits on an association’s board of
directors, as well as giving it the power to interfere with funding.226 Legal recognition of
non-governmental organizations and other civil associations therefore places groups at
the mercy of the Ministry of Justice/Interior and the presidential authority. Fears of
organizations having their activities frozen understandably restrict NGO willingness to
deal with sensitive issues.
The regime also weakens civil society by placing pressure on individual leaders
who challenge the executive’s authority. In March 2005, several government mosques
used their Friday sermon to condemn human rights advocates such as Negad al-Borai and
Saad Eddin Ibrahim as traitors to Egypt for their organization’s acceptance of foreign
funding.227 Even more disturbing, on several occasions, supporters of the regime have
moved to arrest and charge those who challenge the status quo. Quoting the 1996 Press
Law which forbids journalist from engaging in slander, members of the Ministry of the
Interior charged and imprisoned Magdi Ahmed Hussein, editor of al-Sha ’ab Newspaper,
for a story which claimed the Minister’s son had used his father’s position as leverage in

225 “Egypt: Civil Society Groups Severely Restricted,” Human Rights Watch 4 July 2005 (accessed on 2
January 2006); available from http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/07/04/egyptl 1217.htm.
226 “Egypt: Civil Society Groups Severely Restricted,” Human Rights Watch.
227 “Egypt: Margins o f Repression; State Limits on Nongovernmental Organization Activism,” Human
Rights Watch July 2005 (accessed on 2 January 2006); available from
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/egypt0705/index.htm.
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several key business deals.228 Other reformers, like the aforementioned Sa’ad Eddin
Ibrahim and politician Ayman Nour have both spent time in prison for their reform
activities. Moreover, Amnesty International has documented several cases in which nonviolent civilian activists were tried within emergency military courts.

99Q

The regime also

takes a heavy handed approach to protests as well, as a four month long non-violent
demonstration by Sudanese citizens seeking asylum in Mohandessin (Cairo) was brutally
broken up by security forces officers in December 2005, leading to the death of over
twenty individuals.230
Legal restrictions as well as tacit and overt threats of force are used to contain
Egypt’s civil society from seriously challenging the regime directly. Although NGOs
have done much to politicize civil actors to challenge the executive’s monopoly, little can
be done to directly remove the ruling parties control over Egypt’s political environment.
Monopolization o f the Tools o f Force
Critical to any authoritarian system is its ability to use overwhelming force to
maintain its rule against what it cannot control through the other foundations of the
regime’s power. While the dynamics listed above frustrate traditional avenues of reform,
only a disproportionately powerful state security apparatus can contain attempts to
achieve change through more radical means.

That said, the Egyptian state, under

President Mubarak, has also used the military to during election periods to contain legal
challenges to his party’s rule.

228 “Egypt: Muzzling Civil Society,” Amnesty International 19 September 2000 (accessed on 2 January
2006); available from http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGMDE120212000.
229 Amnesty International.
230 “Cairo Violence Toll Rises to 27,” BBC News Online 2 January 2006 (accessed on 2 January 2006);
available from http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/africa/4575496.stm.
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According to Roger Owen, it is essential for the authoritarian state to “destroy
what it cannot control.”231 During the presidency of Gamal Abdul Nasser, the regime
targeted its opponents with ruthless efficiency in the name of the revolution. Islamist
groups like the Muslim Brotherhood found themselves swept away through force

232

as

the country adopted secular socialism as a guiding principle. Sadat originally attempted
to use Nasser’s Islamists opponents as allies for his regime, but growing radicalism and
outspoken condemnation for the president’s peace deal with Israel led to a massive
crackdown by security forces resulting in over 1,500 arrests in the late 1980s. 233
Mubarak’s presidency would mark a full confrontation between the state and
Islamic radical groups. Despite Sadat’s efforts before his assassination, Islamist leaders
and groups had sought to use force in order to carve out space for their authority within
the Egyptian political sphere. For example, during the 1980s, an Islamist leader named
Shaykh Gaber moved his supporters into a desperately poor Cairo neighbourhood near
Imbaba and claimed the area as his own. The state, alerted by an embarrassing Reuter’s
report moved in with 12,000 police to engage in a three week battle that left over six
hundred arrests and casualties.

O'XA

Thousands of political prisoners were taken throughout

the country, as radical imams were forced under house arrest or even had their mosques
surrounded by police on Fridays.235

These restrictions, combined with economic

hardships felt during IMF restructuring, lead to a sharp increase in violence and
repression by the state, resulting in the death of 1,164 people from 1990-1993.236

231 Owen, 27.
232 Kassem, 137.
233 Kassem, 144.
234 Ibrahim, Egypt. Islam and Democracy. 87.
235 Kassem, 150.
236 Ibrahim, Egypt. Islam and Democracv.168.
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Mubarak continually uses state security to obtain political victories for the NDP
party during parliamentary elections.

During 1995, corruption was rampant, with

supporters of the ruling party being allowed to stuff ballot boxes while the opposition was
refused entry.237 Although the state pledged to end these policies in the 2000 elections,
police still prevented opposition supporters from entering polling stations in key districts
while plain clothed agents caused disturbances amongst those waiting to vote, giving
police an excuse to interfere.238 Independent judicial supervisors were powerless to stop
what happened outside the stations, which the law clearly stipulated was the limit of their
jurisdiction.239
The lead up to parliamentary elections in 2005 did lead many to seriously
question whether the regime would truly live up to its renewed pledge to stay neutral
during the campaign, as police forces allowed the Muslim Brotherhood enormous
freedoms to organize.240 These hopes disintegrated however, as impressive victories by
the Brotherhood during initial rounds of the elections lead to massive disruptions by
security forces in the second and third stage. The tactics used by the police remained
consistent with the two previous parliamentary elections, with opposition supporters
being refused entry to the polling stations of key districts.241
The state often uses fears of terrorism to justify its security measures. This was
especially true during the struggle against radical Islamists groups during the 1990s, as
laws pushed to expand the definition of terrorism to allow the President more options in
237 Ouda, al-Borai and Abu Se’ada, 50.
238 Kassem, 60.
239 Ouda, al-Borai and Abu Se’ada, 50.
240 Amira Howeidy, “Egypt’s Brotherhood Takes Center Stage,” A1 Jazeera Online 14 November 2005
(accessed 5 November 2005); available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/DD81F58B-4247413D-8A97-57508546AD73 .htm.
241 Mohammad El Sayeed, “No Voting Allowed,” A1 Ahram Weekly 1-7 December 2005 Issue 771 [online
newspaper]; accessed on 8 December, 2005; available from http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/771/egl.htm.
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dealing with resistance.242 After September 11, 2001, these arguments were met with
increasing approval from Egypt’s Western allies who have encouraged the regime to use
whatever efforts are necessary to win the global “War on Terror”.243 By strengthening
one of the authoritarian foundations of power, international agents have given additional
space for military responses against those seeking change within the Egyptian system,
whether through radical or democratic means.
Since the revolution, the Egyptian executive authority has moved to monopolize
the country’s political sphere by assuming control over any avenue in which reform could
legally take place and using this position to co-opt challenges. The patron-client
relationship therefore allows the regime to have the space to progress or regress on issues
like political or economic reform unilaterally, taking whatever measures are needed to
ensure its hold on power at any given time. The state also uses the threat of force to quell
groups which do not respond to conventional pressure. These factors immobilize
political change and create longstanding social realities which internalize the legitimacy
of authoritarian rule. Over time, these parochial attitudes become a serious societal
barrier to change and can develop into overt hostility against actors challenging the status
quo.

242 Ibrahim, Egypt. Islam and Democracy. 155.
243 Helmore and Jamal, 1.
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One of the minimum demands for any group is a subsistent livelihood and
physical security.244 Protection from external threats has therefore represented a key
foundation for many social structures and exchange relationships throughout history.
Perhaps the best example of this would be the feudal system of medieval Europe.245 For
several centuries, these institutions would see that communities that pledged their
resources to the military elite received protection from the various lords whose vassals
maintained the collective order of the region.
The clientelist system differs with the feudal system in many ways, but it does
share physical security as a critically important resource.

If a patron cannot prevent

violence against its client, that individual or group will often cease participation in the
exchange. At the same time however, the loss of a client’s mentality of vulnerability will
also result in the destabilization of the clientelist relationship. This is due to the fact that
the level of client’s perceived vulnerability largely determines the extent to which they
will conform to their patron’s goals.246 Put another way, the greater the sense of strength
of the client, the less of a need for a patron and greater the decline in the legitimacy of a
clientelist bond.247
These two opposing factors create a dynamic by which the most effective
environment for a clientelist relationship is one with a strong sense of perceived
vulnerability. That is to say, in a reality where widespread violence seems present in a

244 Schmidt, et al., 440.
245 Ibid., 443.
246 Clapham, 12.
247 Ibid., 17.
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latent form. This is once more because exposure to prolonged manifest hostility would
call into question the effectiveness of the patron’s power.
Since the Muslim conquest of Egypt, Christianity has slowly become a religious
minority in the region. Despite commonly held perceptions, this encounter was largely a
peaceful and tolerant relationship, particularly within the context of historical norms
which dominated this era.248

Despite the comparatively high level of religious

acceptance however, several key periods of persecution did manifest themselves
intermittently, creating varying degrees of perceived vulnerability. These periods will
now be explored in order to describe the foundation on which this study argues a
perceived mentality o f Coptic vulnerability exists.
It is important to differentiate however, between these eras as representatives of
sporadic periods of history, and longstanding social norms and religious ideals.

In

particular, misconceptions are often formed around the fallacy that Islam promotes the
forceful conversion and persecution of Christianity. In reality, Islamic ideals constructed
an environment which was significantly tolerant for the period.
Muhammad’s teachings/examples with regards to dhimmis249

The Prophet

are actually quite

systematic, especially considering that many other important issues, including the nature
of leadership succession, remained unexplored by his teachings. This was perhaps
because the issue of relations with the dhimmis were of critical importance during his
lifetime, particularly with Jewish tribes living near the city of Medina. When Muslims
arrived in the area after fleeing persecution in Mecca, they immediately opened
negotiations with nearby Jewish tribes. The conclusions of these discussions and
248 Meinardus, 64.
249 The term dhimmis can be described as a protected minority that exists within the Islamic community
under a formalized framework with the Muslim authority.
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negotiations resulted in what is popularly termed by scholars as the ‘Constitution of
Medina’. This document (in articles 24-35, 37, 38 and 46) states that “The Jews of
various groups belong to the community, and are to retain their own religion; they and the
Muslims are to render ‘help’ (including military aid) to one another when it is needed.”
Severe warnings were then made through the hadith of the Prophet towards Muslims who
would seek to mistreat minorities under Islam’s protection.

A f 1

“Beware whoever is cruel

and hard on such people [dhimmis] or curtail their rights, or burden them with more than
they can endure, or realize anything from them against their free will, I myself will be a
complainant against him on the Day of Judgement.”

Although the idea of a tax for

non-Muslims was recognized, it was to be strictly within their means and only to replace
the contributions to society that Muslims made with the zakat, the mandatory charity paid
by believers each year.

9^9

The Prophet’s positive views on the Coptic Christians are also well documented,
first with his marriage to the Copt Mariyah Qibtiyyah, and second, with his agreement
with the Christian monks of the St. Katherine’s Monastery in Sinai, signed in the year 6
A.H.254 This agreement stipulated that no Christian cleric would be driven out of Egypt,
no monk forced from his monastery, no pilgrim detained from pilgrimage, no churches
converted or destroyed; no Christian compelled to reject his religion and no forcible
conversion for woman who married Muslims.

Speaking of the Copts in general,

251 The hadith represent collected volumes o f sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad by his
companions.
252 Mawdudi, 8.
253 Ibid., 11.
254 The Muslim lunar calendar begins with the hijra, or exodus o f Muslims from Mecca to Medina in 622
A.D.
255 Doi, 76.
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Muhammad is reported to have said to his followers “when you conquer Egypt, be kind
to the Copts...for they are your kith and kin.”

'y r

/

The conquest of Egypt in 641 A.D. by Amr Ibn al-‘As and his four thousand
cavalry was at first a positive experience for the Coptic Christians, as it freed them from
brutal persecution from Constantinople.257 In fact, when Byzantine forces attempted to
retake Egypt in 645-646, the Christian population actively aided Muslim forces in the
territory’s defence.258 Initially, a liberal policy towards religion was taken and the
indigenous Christians saw little significant change in their daily lives.

The Coptic

Church, considered heretical by the Roman Empire, saw a distinct renaissance in both its
literature and tradition under early Islamic rule, as it no longer had to remain hidden from
foreign oppression.260 Positive treatment of the dhimmis in Egypt seemed to have been of
considerable concern to the Muslims, as evidence exists of Caliph Umar writing a
strongly worded letter to Amr and his Egyptian garrison for chastising Christians during a
public event. In the letter, Umar writes, “since when have you enslaved a people, oh
Amr, when their mothers had given birth to them in freedom?”

J/T1

Moreover on an

economic level, imperial taxes for non-Muslims, called the jizyah, were at first much less
than taxes under Byzantine rule.
To state that the Muslim conquest of Egypt and the institution of the dhimmis
framework was an entirely positive experience for Coptic Christians would, however, be

256 C rag g , 173.

257 This will be explored in detail within Chapter Five.
258 E.J. Chitham, The Coptic Community in Egypt: Spatial and Social Change (Durham: Centre for Middle
East and Islamic Studies, 1986), 56
259 Vatikiotis,12.
260 Richard Fletcher, The Crescent and the Cross: The Dramatic Story o f the Earliest Encounters between
Christians and Muslims. (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 40.
261 Mossa, 188.
262 Chitham, 56.
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a mistake. Living under an authority which held a differing religious creed as a primary
social identity eventually would lead to periods of persecution of Christians under the
rule of various Muslim authorities. No matter how intermitted these persecutions
occurred, they created a strong historical mentality of vulnerability which still has an
impact on the current political system. Despite commands for tolerance against dhimmis
described above, the rule of Caliph Umar was not always a positive experience for
Christians. The Caliph’s agreement with the Christians of Jerusalem - often described as
the ‘Pact of Umar’ - would be a curious departure from Muhammad’s Constitution of
Medina and would leave a comparatively stricter legacy for how Muslims should treat
Christians. The Pact discussed how Christians had to refrain from speaking against Islam
as well as from publicly proselytizing their religion. Crosses, public processions and the
ringing of church bells was also discouraged in this agreement, essentially turning
Christian worship into a private activity only. These rules also set specific dress for nonMuslims and stipulated that they would have to ride donkeys or mules, not horses.

The

building of new churches became extremely difficult as well, a trend that would become
a significant problem for the Coptic Christians in Egypt right up to the modem era.264
According to Robert Brenton Betts, “the dhimmis system, while allowing the Heterodox
Christians to keep their religion, churches, and property, and to live according to the
cannon laws of their particular sect, condemned them in effect to a slow but almost
inevitable decline and death.”

'J fLC

Put precisely, although the Coptic Church was freed

from direct persecution from the Roman Empire and allowed to pursue whatever beliefs

263 Bruce Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman World: The Roots o f Sectarianism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 22.
264 Fletcher, 21.
265 Betts, 9.
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it wished, the dhimmis system would weaken the Church in the long term, first by
removing it from the greater Christian world and by undermining its ability to spread. At
the same time, the dhimmis system resulted in realities which favoured conversion to
Islam, a trend that would increase over time. As more and more Arabs moved into
Egypt, they intermarried with the Coptic population, slowly transforming the society
linguistically and religiously.
Not surprisingly, violence broke out as the reality of the dhimmis system set in,
especially when various Muslim rulers moved away from the strict guidelines set down
by Muhammad’s teachings. This was the case during the rule of Caliph Yazid, whose
efforts to remove Christian icons from Egypt resulted in a massive revolt against the
dhimmis system in the mid-eight century A.D. Other riots would eventually break out
over taxation, each brutally suppressed.267 In the Nile Delta, no less than three full scale
revolts took place between 722 and 767 AD. In the south, where the Christian population
was concentrated, a major insurrection broke out in 782 AD. A final revolt would be
organized in 829 near the city of Hawf, and, like the previous rebellions, Muslim
retaliation was swift and brutal.268 This is significant, because moments of intolerance
would act as a formative experience for internalized norms held by both the Coptic
Christians and Muslims.
The Fatmid Dynasty would, for the most part, pursued a policy encouraging a
tolerant relationship with the Coptic Christian community. There is however, the notable
exception of the Caliph al-Hakim, who would, between 1012 and 1015, introduce

266 Vatikiotis, 14.
267Christian Cannuyer, Coptic Egypt: The Christians o f the Nile (New York: Harry N. Abrams Inc., 2001),
65.
268 Chitham, 57.
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widespread persecution towards Coptic Christians and expel them from official
positions.269 Claiming he was a divine manifestation of God270, Hakim ordered all
Christians to be forced to wear a five pound cross around their necks (which often lead to
serious strain and injuries), wear dark clothes and be tattooed.271 Reviving the Pact of
Umar, Coptic Christians were again forced to only ride donkeys272 and many escaped into
the country’s rural areas as the Caliph ordered the destruction of over three thousand
churches.273 Although al-Hakim is largely viewed by scholars as an anomaly (evidence
points to him being clinically insane274), his actions serve as further evidence that not all
Islamic rulers would follow the theoretically liberal guidelines set down by Muhammad
and the early Muslims towards the dhimmis.
The Mamluk Sultanate would however, provide a sustained example of Muslim
persecution towards Coptic Christians.

Riots, encouraged by virulent anti-Christian

rhetoric would push the sectarian tensions in Egypt to the limit 275

Much of this

animosity would stem from suspicion the Sultanate had over Christian loyalty during the
Crusades.276

Period literature began to criticize Christians who “assume a proud

bearing”, with one preacher describing Coptic Christians as “the source of all misfortune
and treason.”277 Later, stories emerged about how Christians in Syria sprinkled Muslims
with wine after the 13th Century Mongol conquest of Baghdad, while chanting the

269 Meinardus, 65.
270 Barbara Watterson, Coptic Egypt (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1988), 156.
271 In fo rm a l In te rv ie w w ith T h o m as E m a d , C o p tic L aw y er. (S h a rm al-S h a y k h , E g y p t, 16 S e p te m b er 2 0 0 5 ).

272 Wakin, 43.
273 Jill Kamil, Christianity in the Land o f the Pharaohs: The Coptic Orthodox Church. (New York:
Routledge, 2002), 243.
274 Watterson, 156.
275 Masters, 24.
276 Van Doom Harder and Vogt, 153.
277 M. Pealmann, “Notes on Anti-Christian Propaganda in the Mamluk Empire,” Bulletin o f the School o f
Oriental and African Studies Vol. 10, No. 4 (1942): 849-850.
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supremacy of Christ.278 Under these conditions, simple actions by Christians, including
church repairs, would result in significant discontent amongst Egyptian Muslims.
Evidence shows that, on one occasion, the promotion of Christian scribes by the Sultan
resulted in widespread riots and the destruction of churches in both Cairo and Alexandria.
In response to the violence, the Sultan doubled the required jizya tax that year.
During the Bahri Mamluk era, there are several examples periods of sustained
campaigns against the dhimmis. One campaign, in 1293 A.D., began when Muslims
observed a Christian leading a Muslim debtor around the city by a rope. In response, the
Sultan removed all Christians from his service and ordered churches and Christian homes
to be attacked and looted 280 Ten years later, the Sultan Nasir Muhammad began to
persecute Christians because an ambassador from the Maghrib (present day Morocco)
was alarmed at how proud the Coptic Christians were during his tour of Cairo. In his
land, he argued, Christians “suffer extreme misery and degradation”. Immediately, new
laws were passed forcing Christians to wear distinct clothing, once more ride only
donkeys, and be forbidden to repair churches. Worst of all, sectarian relations were dealt
another blow by laws which made fraternizing illegal between Christians and Muslims.281
Even Copts that converted were subject to continual discrimination, as the Muslim
community argued their conversion was due entirely upon a desire for power.282 By the
16th Century, Christian payment of the jizyah would evolve into a highly public lesson in
humiliation.283

278 Pealmann, 850.
279 Pealmann, 562-569.
280 Donald P. Little, “Coptic Conversion to Islam under Bahri Mamluks,” Bulletin o f the School o f Oriental
and African Studies Vol. 39. No. 3 (1976): 554.
281 Little, 555-556.
282 Pealmann, 858.
283 Ibid., 860.
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The period between the French invasion under Napoleon and the 1952 Revolution
was a mixed period for the Coptic Christians.

Contrary to expectations, it was the

Egyptians themselves that began to increasingly demand Coptic participation in the
bureaucracy, eventually passing laws declaring non-Muslims as full citizens. Colonial
regimes, as shall be demonstrated in the following section, largely exacerbated sectarian
tensions and hostility against the Copts.
The landing of French forces in Egypt in the late 18 Century increased Muslim
suspicion of the Copts just as it had during the period of the Crusades. Many within the
Ottoman Empire argued that the Coptic Christians should be killed for presenting a “fifth
column” in the Empire.284 This mentality was only eased after significant efforts were
taken to demonstrate the French were not invading under the auspices of Christianity.
Christian participation would increase under Muhammad Ali and his descendants,
who, in the late 19th Century, began to shift towards the political environment towards an
Egyptian national identity which transcended religion.285

Ali would push to take

advantage of Coptic Christian bureaucrats and advisors, while his descendants abolished
the jizyah and allowed non-Muslims to join the army.

Granting Christians prestigious

positions remained controversial, even precarious at first, as traditionally these positions
were given to Muslims.287 The Khedives could carry out these reforms however, because
they held on to the legitimacy of being the first truly Egyptian rulers since antiquity. 288

284 Meinardus, 66.
285 Muhammad Ali was originally the regional authority placed in charge o f Egypt by the Ottoman
Sultanate, before increasingly pushing for autonomy from the Empire.
286 Van Doom-Harder and Vogt, 10, 24.
287 Hasan, 33-34.
288 The regional rulers o f Egypt, which gained considerable autonomy after the reign o f Muhammad Ali.
Although Muhammad Ali and most o f Egypt’s elite were not native to the country, Ali would work
tirelessly to portray himself as an Egyptian, rather than Ottoman ruler.
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For the first time in centuries, the Christians of Egypt were removed from the dhimmis
system and its ideological descendants and free to participate in mainstream politics.
Later, under the British, Copts were once again faced with discrimination. The
British were acutely aware of the fact that the Coptic Christians were again being called
collaborators with a foreign power, and countered the rise of animosity by not placing
Christians in prominent positions.289 In fact, British efforts to assure Muslims the best
positions in the bureaucracy led Copts to form protests councils, such as the in the one
held in Asyut in 1910. Their complaints included the desire to have Sunday made a
holiday and the opening of more positions to Christians, including more seats on
provisional councils.290 Eventually, frustration with British rule would lead to Copts
joining with Muslims in nationalist movements committed to put “Egypt First”. 291
Participation with secular nationalist parties like the Wafd saw Coptic Christians enjoy
increasing representation in the National Assembly (including elections in 1924, 1928,
1936 and 1942).292
A new sense of vulnerability would be created however with the growth of
Islamist movements in Egypt. Tensions had already begun to mount over the perception
of Coptic control in the Wafd movement.

This was encouraged by the rhetoric of

opposition political parties like the Liberal Constitutionalists who began to attack the
Wafd using religion. Although secular nationalists as well, the Liberal Constitutionalists
argued that the Wafd was trying to hide the fact that it was a Coptic Christian party from
the Muslim populace.

Drawing off Nazi propaganda, the Liberal Constitutionalists

289 Hasan, 35.
290 Meinardus, 75.
291 Vatikiotis, 208.
292 Hasan, 40.
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would use the same rhetoric that Hitler used against the Jews to weaken the Wafd and
their Christian supporters.293 Arguments that the Coptic Christians were trying to create
their own state increased pressures for the Wafd separate itself from Christian support.
This was heightened as attacks against churches began to intensify in 1946.294
The ideal of a joint secular Egyptian identity was also strained by the pressure of
Hasan al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood. Arguing a full return to the tenets of an
Islamic state, al-Banna described how “Voices are raised proclaiming the necessity to
return to these [Islamic] principles, teachings and ways of Islam...for initiating the
reconciliation of modem life with these principles, as a prelude to final Tslamization”’.295
Al-Banna called for the return to Islamic shari’ah as the basis for Egyptian law and
described how secularization was the root cause of weakening in the Arab world.296 Not
surprisingly, Egyptian Christians reacted to this development with a great deal of
suspicion, fearing that revived Islamist political groups would push towards a new Pact of
Umar and a neo-dhimmis system.297 That said, throughout his lifetime, al-Banna argued
that Christians would remain full citizens of an Islamic state, and even included a Copt on
his Bureau of Muslim Brothers.298 This concept of tolerance remains the official line of
the Muslim Brotherhood to this day, which, according to senior party member Essam alErien, is committed to opening up a “political space” for Christians within the Egyptian
state.299 In fact, an entire section of the Brotherhood’s ‘Reform Initiative’ which was

293 H asan , 49.

294 Ibid., 50, 53.
295 John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name o f Islam. (New York: Oxford University Press,
2002), 52.
296 Esposito, Unholy War. 52.
297 Masters, 186.
298 Van Doom-Harder and Vogt, 26.
299 Informal interview with Essam al-Erien, senior spokesperson for the Muslim Brotherhood. (Cairo,
Egypt, 14 December 2005).
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released during the 2005 elections dealt with relations with their “Coptic Brothers”, and
lists the following principles:
i) Copts are a part of the fabric of the Egyptian society.
They are partners of the nation and destiny. Our rights are
theirs, our duties are theirs.
ii) Freedom of belief and worship for all is respected.
Cooperation that serves the society and is in the best
interest of citizens is an obligation for all.
iii) Keenness on the brotherhood spirit that has been linking
all Egyptians (Muslims and Copts) for centuries, spreading
the foundations of love and harmony among them, so as to
enable the nation to work comprehensively for building the
future.
iv) Emphasising national unity, not allowing any activity
that leads to inciting feelings of religious sedition or ethnic
fanaticism among Egyptians.300

Despite these positive ideologies, it is important to remember that mentalities of
vulnerability can develop over what is perceived to be a threat, even if in reality that
threat is not legitimately there.

That said, the concern by Christians over Islamist

movements is not entirely irrational. This is largely due to divisions which existed in
Islamists movement from the beginning. Although al-Banna believed Coptic Christians
should have full citizenship, Sayyid Qutb and other more radical brothers disagreed
strongly.301 Early in the group’s development, popular slogans included “Our Religion
and not Two Religions/No Cross After Now!”, while others alluded to the anti-Zionist
movements being a prelude to an assault on Christianity, “Today is Saturday/ Tomorrow
is Sunday”.302 Brotherhood criticism of Copts also targeted their assumed connection to
colonial authorities, often saying foreign influences had corrupted the Christian

300 Muslim Brotherhood, Muslim Brotherhood Initiative; On the General Principles o f Reform in Egypt
(Cairo: The Muslim Brotherhood, 2005), 32.
301 Van Doom-Harder and Vogt, 32.
302 Wakin 73.
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community.

Although it can be argued that the party does not control all of its

members, it is reasonable to assume that they alone would shape the message being
presented in their official newspaper al-Dawah. Unfortunately, this too has often been
highly inflammatory towards Coptic Christians, especially during the 1970s.304 During
this period, al-Dawah described Egypt as a paradise for Coptic Christians, placing blame
for sectarian violence on Pope Shenuda. The paper routinely accused the patriarch of
undermining Egyptian solidarity, included culling “militant monks” and the constant use
of aid from foreign elements that sought to interfere in the country’s domestic affairs.
Extremist off-shoots of the Brotherhood have made the situation even more
problematic and inflammatory. Although the mainstream Brotherhood does not believe
in the use of violence towards revolutionary Islamization, others, like Tanzim al-Jihad,
have pushed to overthrow the government with a radical Islamic regime. These groups
are extremely hostile to the Coptic Christians, and argue their traditional protected status
under the dhimmis system has been withdrawn because of their efforts to undermine a
return to an Islamic state. This and other Islamist extremist groups maintain that along
with communists and Zionists, Christians in Egypt must all be killed.306
In response to the perceived Islamist threat and the monopolization of political
power under Nasser after the Revolution, the Coptic community began to organize
around insular institutions created by the Church.

Although the specifics of this

movement will be discussed in the following chapter, the following paragraphs will

303 Watterson, 175.
304 Hasan, 107.
305 Alberto M. Fernandez, In the Year o f the Martyr: Anti-Coptic Violence in Egypt 1988-1993 (San
Francisco: Middle East Studies Association 35th Annual Meeting, 2001), 2.
306 Denis J. Sullivan and Sana Abed Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs. The State
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 78.
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outline President Sadat’s response to what was perceived as a threat to presidential
authority. Sadat’s policies maximized the Coptic mentality of vulnerability and would
represent, according to this study, a key factor for the later establishment of a clientelist
relationship under President Mubarak.
Sadat maximized Coptic vulnerability in several ways.

First, as mentioned

previously, successful efforts were made to pass constitutional amendments to make
shari ’ah law the foundation for the state’s legal code. In 1971, this resulted in Clause
Two being changed to read that “Islam is the religion of the state” and that shari ’ah was
“a principle” source of legislation.

By 1980, this was again amended, this time to

describe shari ’ah as “the principle” source of legislation.

-1A-}

This resulted in a series of

efforts throughout the 1970s in which the Egyptian legislature debated over how to
codify shari'ah into law.

TOR

In response to Coptic Christians’ uproar about the renewed

emphasis on religion, Sadat responded in his famous speech that all Egyptians should
realize he is the “Muslim President of an Islamic State”.309
The second way in which Sadat contributed to Christian perceptions of
vulnerability was to support various Islamists groups, even when they openly described
•

•

•

the Coptic Christians as being an impediment to the creation of an Islamic state.

Tin

Groups were now allowed to organize and infiltrate Egyptian universities, gaining the
support of a new generation of youth. Islamist programming eventually became a major
segment on Egyptian television (while Copts were limited to a broadcast on Easter) as
discriminatory passages began to appear in the official school curriculum arguing that

307 Zubaida, 166.
308 Ibid., 168.
309 Michael Curtis, Religion and Politics in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), 86.
310 Hasan, 106.
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Islam is a superior religion.311 Perhaps most disturbingly, increasing evidence began to
mount to suggest the public school system was tacitly encouraging Christian students to
•

•

T 1“7

convert religions.

The third factor in Sadat’s move to challenge the Church came from his
unwarranted rhetoric of the Coptic clergy representing a separatist movement within
Egypt. Rhetoric of Christians mobilizing to break away in Asyut or Alexandria became
popular, as well as ideas that monks were stockpiling weapons in monasteries.

Sadat

himself argued in a speech in 1980 that the Pope was turning his community into a “fifth
column”. One year later, in front of the National Assembly, Sadat described how
Christians were working with Lebanese Phalange and taking money from West Germany
to violently create their own state.314 Attacks on Coptic Christians that followed were
ignored by the President, who continually blamed outsiders for terrorism. In one case in
^1^
1980, attacks on several churches in the country were blamed on an “Iranian spy”.
•

Finally, in an act meant clearly to instil a sense of vulnerability in the Church, Sadat
placed Pope Shenuda and over 170 clergy under house arrest.

Pope Shenuda would
i i / r

remain in custody until he was released by President Mubarak in 1985.
The mentality of vulnerability was also greatly enhanced by extremist violence
which targeted Christians during Sadat’s presidency. Repeated attacks against the Coptic
Christian community began increasing in frequency during the debate over placing
shari ’ah in the constitution began in 1971. For example, only a year after the amendment

311 Ibid., 171,173.
312 Informal interview with Negad al-Borai, Director o f the Group for Democratic Development. (Cairo,
Egypt, 12 December 2005).
313 Solihin, 75-77.
314 Hasan, 115-116.
315 Ibid., 115.
316 Ibid., 113.
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was passed, a Coptic church was stoned, then set ablaze after Muslims learned of a priest
whose healing “miracles” had convinced over three hundred Egyptians to convert to
Christianity.317 In November 1972, fighting broke out in the village of Khanka (near
Cairo), over plans to use a private home as a chapel. By the end of the skirmish, the
building in which the chapel was planned had been completely razed to the ground.
Clergy sent by the Church to investigate the incident started more riots, resulting in
Christian shops and homes being looted throughout the village.318 1977 saw a priest
murdered by Muslims in the town of Tewfikya, while 1978-79 would see the Church of
Abu Zaabal (Cairo) and the historic Church of the Virgin (al-Damshriyya) burned down
by arsonists.319 1980 saw a significant wave of Church burnings in Minya and Firkria as
well as a bombing campaign against Christian sites across the country (particularly
Alexandria).320 Finally, in 1981, Muslim protests over a proposed Church resulted in the
murder of Christians in Zawya al-Hamra.321
Under President Hosni Mubarak, the shift to the system of a more balanced
vulnerability described in the opening paragraphs of this chapter is seen to develop. This
of course, is necessary in order to maintain a mentality which supports the continuation
of the clientelist relationship with the clergy that formed during his presidency. It is clear
however that after two decades of Mubarak’s rule, the hostile rhetoric which existed
between the ruling party and the Coptic Church is no longer present.

That said,

according to Gasser Abdel-Razek of the Egyptian Organization of Human Rights,
concrete positive human rights reforms have been largely superficial (such as the
317 C u rtis, 83.
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declaration of Coptic Christmas as a holiday) while substantial reforms are delayed
(particularly the Church Permit Law which remains based on a 140 year old Ottoman
Decree that demands the Coptic Church to get government permission to build or repair a
church).322 Although the government had officially ceased directed criticism of the
Coptic Christians, it has not moved to eliminate the roots of intolerance themselves.323
Moreover, although the personal relationship between President Mubarak and
Pope Shenuda has improved greatly, little serious effort has been made to heal the
mentality of vulnerability which grew greatly under Sadat.324 Coptic Christians remain
marginalized in Egyptian politics, with low representation in parliament, cabinet,
university administrations and governorships.325 Even discrimination in the media (TV,
movies) as well as within the school curriculum have remained.326 One example of this
was a television serial or musalsal which was aired in February 1990.

Based on

sensationalized reports of Copts running pornography/drug rings with Muslim women
(reports that were eventually proven to be invented by a 19 year old Muslim girl after
being discovered in a relationship with a Coptic man), this serial would inspire violence
to break out in Upper Egypt.327
Under Mubarak (though without the support that was seen during Sadat), Islamist
parties and organizations quickly monopolized student unions and organizations on

322 In fo rm al in te rv ie w w ith G a sse r A b d e l-R a z e k , se n io r m e m b e r o f th e E g y p tia n O rg a n iz a tio n fo r H u m an
R ights. (C airo , E g y p t, 30 O c to b e r 2005).

323 Informal interview with Ahmed Samih, Director o f the Al-Andalus Center for Tolerance and AntiViolence Studies. (Cairo, Egypt, 14 November 2005).
324 Ahmed Samih, interview.
325 Amber Neumann, Interview with Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Director o f the Ibn Khaldun Center. (Cairo,
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several university campuses.328 Islamic NGOs, pursuing a message of social justice,
moved to monopolize Egyptian civil society, and now represent over eight thousand of
the country’s fourteen thousand volunteer organizations.329

Islamist groups have

thoroughly infiltrated the education system, causing the Minister of Education to report in
1994 that students were being taught “not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem or
talk or study with Christian students”.330

Proffessional syndicates have also been

dominated by Islamist groups during the 1990s, despite intensive government attempts to
interfere. In 1992, groups calling themselves the “Islamic Trend” and “Islamic Voice”
won control over the Lawyer’s Syndicate and the Doctor’s Syndicate. In the case of the
later, Islamists won seventy-two percent of the vote despite the fact that the Doctor’s
■ jo I

Syndicate has a heavy Coptic Christian presence.

Other syndicates controlled by the

Islamists include the Pharmacists, Scientists and Engineer’s Guild.
Although most of these Islamist groups were peaceful and have extended
recognition of Coptic Christian presence in Egypt, extremist have continued to attack
Christians in the name of religion. Islamist militant groups have often robbed Coptic
businessmen in order to finance their operations, while in 1992, reports surfaced of
Muslims in the town of Manshiet Nasr who were forcing their Christian neighbours to
pay them jizyah,333 In 1995, thirteen Copts were murdered during mass at the St. George
Church in Abu Korkas.334 Two years later, violence claimed the lives of fourteen Copts

328 Wickham, 2.
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in Bahgoura.335 In 1998, in the village of al-Kosheh, two Christians were beaten to death
in a brawl. Perhaps more significant, attempts by newspapers like al-Watani and human
rights groups to investigate the incident were frustrated by the government.

in/:

In 2000,

violence flared once more in al-Kosheh, with twenty-two people killed in a riot involving
shooting from both Christians and Muslims.337 The basis of the violence was a simple
argument between a Christian trader and a Muslim shopper which eventually lead to riots
that lasted for over forty-eight hours.

-IIO

Sectarian violence would again break out in the city of Alexandria in October
2005 in response to a play being released on DVD which made several offensive
statements about Islam. Encouraged by inflammatory articles in the al-Osbo newspaper,
a Muslim youth stabbed a nun, Sarah Rushdie Sidhum Mikhail, for allegedly selling the
DVD.339 After Friday prayers, a crowd of over three thousand Muslims began to attack
Christian churches and businesses, as well as state security personnel.340 After the
violence had settled, four churches in Alexandria were damaged, as well as numerous
Christian businesses.

Over sixty-three people were injured in the violence, including

twenty-nine police officers.341 The most recent violence occurred on April 14, 2006,
when 25 year old Mahmoud Salah-Eddin Abdel-Raziq attacked worshipers in

335 C an n u y er, 109.

336 David Aikman, “Egypt’s Human Wrongs,” The American Spectator Vol. 32, No. 3 (March 1999): 64.
337 Cannuyer, 109.
338 Kees Huban, “20 Christians Die as Village Tensions Flare,” Christianity Today Vol. 44, No. 2 (2000),
31.
339The Al-Andalus Center for Tolerance and Anti-Violence Studies and the Group for Democratic
Development. Autumn o f Hatred: Fact Finding Mission Report. (Cairo: 2005), 4.
340 Al-Andalus Center for Tolerance and Anti-Violence Studies, 4.
341 Ibid., 4-5.
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Alexandrian churches. The resulting deaths and injuries began sustained protest from
Christians calling upon an end to Coptic persecution.342
It is important to note that the state no longer engages in the inflammatory
language that was prevalent during the presidency of Anwar Sadat. On the contrary, a
sustained rhetoric of national unity has been a key foundation of the Mubarak era. This
can be seen in symbolic gestures, such as the President’s son Gamal Mubarak attending
Pope Shenuda’s Christmas mass in 2003, the same year the celebration became
recognized as a national holiday.343 Extremist attacks are responded to very seriously by
state security forces, but little is done to comprehensively remove the root source of
sectarian tensions. According to S. S. Hasan, the state is very careful not to eliminate
Islamist groups, opting instead to contain and control them.344 This would represent a
relationship that would not be unlike that which exists between the state and the Coptic
Orthodox Church.

In both cases, a balance has been created by which a level of

vulnerability is maintained to promote a system which favours Mubarak’s supremacy.345

342 “Coptic Church Attack Sparks Anger,” BBC News Online 15 April 2006; accessed 16 April 2006;
available from http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/middle_east/4911346.stm.
343 “Egypt marks Copts' Christmas,” BBC News Online 7 January 2003; accessed 7 July 2006; available
from http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/middle_east/2635341.stm.
344 Hasan, 264.
345 Negad al-Borai, interview.
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The previous chapters have focused mainly on the political environment in which
the Coptic Orthodox Church finds itself. In order to outline the patron-client relationship
between the clergy and the regime however, discussion must shift to describe the
dynamics of the Orthodox Christian community itself. Chapter Two described patronclient relationships generally as an exchange between two actors. In order for such a
relationship to exist, the Coptic community would need a significant level of communal
solidarity under a single authority. This is not always the case with sectarian groups, as
communities often can have competing authorities each trying to lead at a national
level.346 High levels of factionalism, not surprisingly, often destabilize any attempt at a
systemic patron-client arrangement.

The question therefore is whether Egyptian

Christians represent a unified community, and if so, is this community unified under the
Orthodox Church as previously suggested.
The premise of this chapter is therefore to demonstrate the mechanisms with
which the Orthodox Church uses to maintain communal solidarity under its authority.
The Church’s position as communal patron has not gone unchallenged, as secular groups
and other Christian denominations exist within Egypt, disrupting Coptic clerical control.
The foundation of clerical power, not surprisingly, depends partly on ideologies which
place religious concerns over secular-political ones. Put another way, the power of the
Orthodox Church depends on a Coptic identity which is religiously active and politically
apathetical. The specific need for this political apathy will be fully explained when the

346 Schmidt, et al., 135.
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patron-client relationship with the regime is outlined in Chapter Six.

This chapter

however, will simply attempt to demonstrate that the Orthodox Church pressures its
community to avoid participation in mainstream political life.
In order to achieve this apathy, the Orthodox Church relies on theological
traditions which it uses as an ideological base to urge Coptic Christians not to engage in
secular political life. These ideologies all promote a denial of material concerns for
concentration on spiritual sacrifice and religious activities.
Concepts of political apathy are also based on historical mentalities of
exceptionalism and victimization within the Coptic community, identities which have
been emphasized in order to justify ideologies of political apathy. The combination of
these historical mentalities and the theological beliefs described above therefore create a
powerful motivation for religious activities outside of the mainstream political sphere.
Therefore, an in-depth examination of both will monopolize the first section of this
chapter. The second section will focus on how these ideologies, and, more importantly,
the Orthodox Church itself was able to regain control of the Coptic community during the
20th Century.
Roman and Byzantine Persecution o f Coptic Christians
The roots of the above mentioned mentalities are in many ways linked to the
feeling of vulnerability discussed in Chapter Four.

These perceptions pre-date Islam

however, and can be traced to the rise of Christianity in Egypt itself. Legend describes
how the apostle St. Mark journeyed into Africa to establish the Holy See of Alexandria
on May 8th, 68 AD.347 He would establish an unbroken line of 117 patriarchs which

347 Meinardus, 28.
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would lead up to the current Coptic pontiff.348 In reality the history of Christianity’s
influx into Egypt is slightly more complex. Historical information on the apostles of
Jesus by and large does not exist, meaning there is no actual evidence to support the
narrative that St. Mark brought Christianity to the region.349 In fact, almost no concrete
information on the Christian community of Egypt exists before the 2nd Century AD.350
Historians believe however, that the movement began within the Hellenistic Jewish
community of Alexandria.351 Roman authorities certainly considered early Christians to
be a Jewish cult, and evidence exists to demonstrate the community was subject to antiJewish laws of the period.352 These laws included orders to immediately execute people
found to not worship pagan gods as well as edicts which made proselytizing a crime for
Jews.

Jewish persecution was nothing new in the Empire, but was growing steadily

during the first century A.D., with a massacre by Tiberius Julius Alexander in the year 66
and the widespread violence which accompanied the destruction of the second temple in
Jerusalem four years later.354 Under the Emperor Trajan, Jewish revolts in 115 A.D. lead
to a retaliation so severe that it almost eliminated the community in Egypt entirely.355
Christian separation from Judaism likely began in the second century A.D. and
would take almost three hundred years to complete.356 Ironically, this process was most
likely aided by the weakening of Jewish orthodox influence teachings under Roman

348 Ibid., 29.
349 Florence D. Friedman, Beyond the Pharaohs: Egypt and the Copts in the 2nd to 7th Centuries A.D (Rhode
Island: R h o d e Is la n d S c h o o l o f D e sig n , 1989), 41.

350 Birger A. Pearson, Gnosticism and Christianity in Roman and Coptic Egypt (New York: T&T Clark
International, 2004), 12.
351 Friedman, 41 and Pearson, 15.
352 Watterson, 24.
353 Watterson, 21 and 202.
354 Pearson, 83.
355 Ibid., 83.
356 Ibid., 88.
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persecution.357 This does not mean however, that persecution from pagan Roman
authorities would cease to target Christians.358 In fact, evidence points to Egypt being a
major centre for pagan imperial violence against Christians.

-IC Q

Some of the first waves of

persecution were ordered by the Emperor Decius, but these were soon surpassed by the
unprecedented attacks carried out under the reign of Diocletian.

During this period,

hundreds of churches were razed, with their congregations enslaved, imprisoned and
tortured.

Tens of thousands were killed for their Christian beliefs during this period

,

which is still remembered as the “era of the martyrs”.
Eventually persecution would end under Constantine, and the Church of
Alexandria would be allowed to establish itself as a mainstream religious centre. The
Coptic Church had already organized itself as an autonomous organization under its first
historically verifiable patriarch, St. Demetrius (circa. 125 AD).363

Under his

administration, a college of elders (presbyters) was created in order to unify Christians
within Egypt.364 This presbyteroi would also select the various bishops (episcopus) in
Egypt, including the Patriarch of Alexandria.

As the power of the Egyptian Church

expanded, it began to produce some of the great minds of early Christianity, including
Titus Flavius Clement (160-215 A.D.) and his pupil Origen.366 In fact, Alexandria would
become increasingly important in the development of Christian theology until infighting

357 Cannayuyer, 20.
358 Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History o f Struggle and Self-Expression. 2nd ed.
(L o n d o n : M c F a rla n d & C o m p a n y In c ., 2 0 0 2 ), 135.

359 Cannuyer, 26.
360 Watterson, 31-33.
361 Friedman, 42.
362 Cannauyer, 26.
363 Ibid., 20.
364 Pearson, 16.
365 Cannauyer, 19.
366 Hasan, 24.
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and internal schisms began.367 Within a short time, Egyptian Christianity would again be
persecuted and forced out the mainstream, only this time, the violence would be carried
out by other Christians.
In order to understand the next wave of persecutions against Egyptian
Christianity, it is necessary to briefly discuss various Christological arguments that would
develop during the reign of Constantine and his successors. As pagan persecution ended
and various Christian churches were allowed to become mainstream, debate began over
the plurality of interpretations which existed at the time. Christology, simply the study of
the nature of Christ, was one of the main points of contention. Questions over what the
term “Son of God” and “Son of Man” actually meant with regards to Christian belief
were considered extremely important.
One of the most prominent Christological movements which would later be
declared heretical by the Roman Empire was Arianism. Founded by the North African
theologian Arius (256-336 A.D.), the movement described Christ as existentially less
divine than the Father.369 This meant that Christ and the Father were not of the same
substance and that a clear hierarchy existed between them.

Other theologians, like

Nestorius (386-451 AD) believed that Christ was two distinct persons, one wholly divine,
and one wholly human.370

Another opinion was held by Eutyches (380-456 A.D.), a

monk from Constantinople who argued both of Christ’s natures were divine and that his
material body was not that of a normal man.371 It is interesting to note that all of these

367 Watterson, 36.
368 Fletcher, 4.
369 Friedman, 42.
370 Watterson, 42.
371 Fouad Guirguis, The Difficult Years o f Survival: A Short History o f the Coptic Church (New York:
Vintage Press, 1985), 9.
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opinions were eventually considered heretical by the Imperial Church.

The essential

reason for this revolves around Orthodox understandings of the significance of Christ’s
resurrection. If Christ was not human and divine, it was argued, there would be no saving
grace from his death and resurrection.372 The Orthodox answer to this question would be
largely decided at the Council of Nicaea (325 A.D.) where a decision was made by
assembled theologians that Jesus is both God and Man within a single substance
(homoousis).

‘X'l'X

The next wave of controversy would revolve around the nature of how Jesus’ two
essences interacted within the person of Christ, a debate which would result in a return to
the brutal persecution of the Egyptian Church. The Egyptians (along with other Christian
sects) believed in a theology of monophysitism, a philosophy which states that Christ’s
human and divine natures were completely fused into one essence through the mystery of
the incarnation.374 According to the current Coptic patriarch, Pope Shenuda III, “His
humanity is one with His Divinity without commixture, without confusion, without
division, without separation.”375 In other words, Christ was “one person from two
persons”.376

The Imperial position at the Council of Chalcedon was only slightly

different, that Christ had two essences which, although permanently united within one
substance, remained unmixed.377 It is difficult to imagine that such a small theological
difference could lead to the brutal persecution of the Egyptian Church by Constantinople.
Not surprisingly, there is also a much more earthly explanation for the rift which was to

372 Friedman, 35.
373 Ibid., 43.
374 Meinardus, 53.
375 Ibid., 6.
376 Wakin, 6.
377 Meinardus, 53.
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come. As mentioned above, the prominence of the See of Alexandria was unquestionable
during this period, and rivalries had developed between its Patriarch and the Patriarch of
the Imperial capital of Constantinople.

Many historians argue that the Council of

Chalcedon was simply an attempt to undermine Alexandria’s power.378 During this
period, the most efficient way to undermine the Egyptian Church was to trap their
Patriarch in heresy.

T7Q

Persecution of the Egyptian Church began swiftly. Imperial authorities handed
over control of the See of Alexandria, despite serious riots amongst Egyptian Christians,
to bishops who accepted the tenets of the Council of Chalcedon.380 These bishops would
therefore form what would be called the “Melkite” or Imperial Church.381 From this
moment on, a distinct schism would be formed between Egyptian bishops loyal to
Constantinople, and the majority of Egyptian clerics and believers who held a staunchly
monophysite philosophy. To signal their independence, monophysite churches began to
write in Coptic instead of Greek, in an attempt to demonstrate that they represented the
true Egyptian Christianity.

Byzantine authorities, pushing to ensure adherence to

orthodoxy, engaged in serious persecutions of the Egyptian monophysites, particularly
under Emperor Leo (474) and Justinian (6th Century A.D.).383 According to Aziz S.
Atiya, “unbearable excessive taxation and the most horrible torture and humiliation were
inflicted upon the Christians throughout the period from 451 to 641 until the advent of

378 Guirguis, 36.
379 Kyriakos Mikhail, Copts and Muslims Under British Control: A Collection o f Facts and a Resume o f
Authoritative Opinions on the Coptic Question (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1911; reprint, 1971), 4.
380 Guirguis, 38.
381 Mikhail, 5.
382 Van Doom-Harder and Vogt, 36.
383 Watterson, 47.
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the Arabs on the scene.”384 That said, monophysite Christianity did not disappear, but
instead became an expression of Egyptian national pride in the face of foreign Christian
authorities.385
The goal of the above discussion was to demonstrate that since its very creation
and with little exception, Egyptian Christianity has existed outside of mainstream
Christianity.

This has created a historical mentality of separation, victimization and

distinctiveness within the Egyptian Christian community which was been used to
encourage Copts from involving themselves in modern mainstream politics. This insular
identity is further exacerbated by ascetic ideologies which are a critical foundation of
Egyptian Christian theology.
Asceticism in Coptic Ideologies
The earliest roots of ascetic philosophies in the Egyptian Church most likely
derive from Gnostic cults which slowly replaced Judaism as the primary influence of
Coptic Christians.

Integrated into Christianity by influential theologians like

Valentinus (100-153 A.D.) and Basilides (117-138 A.D.) 387, Gnosticism infused ascetic
principles into Coptic Church which still continue today.
Gnostic beliefs represented a complex and diverse tradition, but in its most basic
form, the movement argued that salvation for mankind could only be achieved through a
gnosis (knowledge) of oneself.

000

The material body and lower primal emotions were not

existentially part of the self, as ones real form was only the divine core of the soul.389 In

384 Aziz S. Atiya, The Copts and Christian Civilization (Utah: University o f Utah Press, 1979), 27.
385 Watterson, 47.
386 Cannuyer, 20.
387 Pearson, 13.
388 Guirguis, 202.
389 Pearson, 97.
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fact, Gnosticism argued that a person’s divine and eternal soul was trapped by their
material body, and salvation came from attempts to set the soul free.390 Gnostic teachings
were the only way that this escape could be accomplished.391 Most often on a practical
level, Gnostic practice advocated a denial of the material world and all bodily
temptations.

392

Gnostic philosophies overtime became deluded in Egypt by Christian influence
over the centuries. Ascetic principles however, would live on in Coptic monasticism,
another philosophy of self-denial and a rejection of the material world. The roots of
Egyptian monastic movements pre-date Christianity as well, with historical evidence
suggesting several groups existed before the birth of Christ.

Many of these groups

practiced similar ascetic philosophies as later Christian monks, suggesting a long
standing tradition in the region. Examples of pre-Christian monastic groups included the
Katachoi, who lived in the catacombs of the ancient city of Memphis, as well as the
Gymnosophists, a group which worshiped the Nile and abstained from meat and
“passionate emotions”. Other groups included the Rapeutae, a group localized around
pharonic caves outside Alexandria who sought to heal their souls by purging it of
desire.

303

«

•

These ascetic philosophies of finding solace within the desert would be again

revived by Christians during the various phases of Roman persecution described above394
and was arguably a social replacement for the glory of martyrdom.395

390 Friedman, 48.
391 Ibid., 48.
392 Cannuyer, 23.
393 Watterson, 54-55.
394 Cannuyer, 33.
395 Friedman, 45.
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The first Christian to practice monasticism is believed to be St. Anthony (d. 356
A.D.), who, inspired by the example of the apostles, sold all of his possessions to pursue
the path of Christ.396 He argued an ascetic life style was ordered by Christ in the Gospel
of Luke (specifically, Chapter 18, Verse 22) and that all monks must give up pleasure to
•

the body of any sort, including regular patterns of sleeping and substantive meals.
These ideas of dahiya (self-denial) were key to the life of an early Christian monk.

TQ7

•3QO

Although St. Anthony gathered a following around the town of Pispir,399 he himself
would choose to practise his ascetic monasticism in solitude.400 The advent of coenobite
or communal monasticism would derive later with Pachomius (d. 348 A.D.), who pushed
for the creation of self sufficient community monasteries.401 Pachomius also promoted
ascetic principles, even advocating practices of self-mortification out of a principle of
torturing the body to save the soul 402 Men were not alone in these ascetic pursuits, as
historical evidence demonstrates that female monks often wandered the deserts of Egypt
“looking for God”.403
Coptic writings would celebrate this lifestyle of poverty and self-denial. For
example, a famous homily written by St. Peter (Patriarch of Alexandria from 300-311
AD) called On Riches warned Christians not to glorify the material world.

God, it

argues, will avenge the poor against the rich 404 The monastery also preformed an
important role for lay Copts as well, often serving as shelters during persecution and

396 W a tte rso n , 56.

397 Cannuyer, 33.
398 Van Doom-Harder and Vogt, 61.
399 Waterrson, 59.
400 Atiya, 11.
401 Cragg, 176.
402 Atiya, 12-13.
403 Friedman, 45.
404 Pearson, 119-120.
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offering a sense of permanence for the community in the face of uncertainty.405 Monastic
leaders would join famous martyrs of the faith and other “legendary folk heroes” as a
symbol of Coptic identity and the foundation for a broader communal framework.406
The significance of the monastery today is no less apparent. Although the revival
of the Coptic Church will be discussed in the second section of this chapter, it is
important to understand the role of monasticism in the modern Egyptian community. As
mentioned above, Copts take extreme pride in the history of their monasteries, which
were the first to appear in Christendom.407 Today, the monastery is considered an
“eternal source of religion” and place where God “touches humanity”.408 The monks
themselves are seen as the very elite of the Coptic Church,409 and their numbers have
grown substantially during the Twentieth Century. Estimates show that from 1970 to
1997, the number of monks in the Coptic Church has increased from two hundred to over
eleven hundred, and the number of nuns from under two hundred to almost eight
hundred.410 Monks are highly educated and monasteries are increasingly attracting many
within the Coptic professional elite.411 Monasteries also serve an important practical role,
increasingly serving as popular sites for baptisms and weddings amongst the Coptic
youth.412
The most explicit ideological rejection of the material world is, of course, an
adoration of martyrdom, a belief widely celebrated in Coptic theology. According to
Christian Cannuyer, “to this day, Coptic spirituality and identity are imbued with the
405 Chitham, 65.
406 Hasan, 4.
407 Hasan, 4.
408 Van Doom-Harder and Vogt, 52.
409 Wakin, 7.
410 “The Church o f the Martyrs,” Christianity Today Vol. 41 (August 1997): 44.
411 Van Doom-Harder and Vogt, 245.
412 Hasan, 218.
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memory of the men and women who died for their faith in the ancient world. Copts may
even, at times, embrace a kind of obsession with martyrdom, exacerbating their
conflicts.. .”413 Coptic veneration of martyrs can be traced back to the earliest days of the
Church, during the periods of intense persecution described above.414 Egyptian Christian
leaders argued that their communities should not fight or even flee their enemies, as this
was not the example that Christ demonstrated.415 Barbara Watterson describes that
“many Christians deliberately sought martyrdom and rejoiced as they went to their deaths
so that in modern eyes, it may seem that they were neurotic, if not masochistic.. .”416
Even with this intense zeal, the Christian community was seriously strained by the
unprecedented persecution placed upon them during the reign of Diocletian. With more
than 144,000 Christians estimated killed,417 this period has been forever enshrined in the
Coptic Christian mindset. In order to illustrate this, one has to look no further than the
Coptic calendar, which begins in 284 A.D., the year Diocletian became Emperor and has
the entire month o f September dedicated to the Egyptian Christian martyrs of this
period.418 Even the calendar itself leaves no ambiguity, being named “the era of the
martyrs”.419
The significance of the martyr in the Coptic community serves several purposes.
According to one study, “martyrdom is an identity shaping tool used by communities
seeking to distinguish itself from the other”.420 Martyrdom also creates heroes which the

413 C a n n u y er, 2 6 .

414 Van Doom-Harder and Vogt, 121.
415 Hasan, 94.
416 Watterson, 22.
417 Betts, 55.
418 Hasan 22, 25.
419 Van Doom-Harder and Vogt, 124.
420 Jason R. Zaborowski, The Coptic Martyrdom o f John o f Phaniioit: Assimilation and Conversion to
Islam in Thirteenth Century Egypt (Boston: Koninklijke Brill, 2005), 6.
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Church can use to strengthen the community.421 Some of the most famous Coptic martyrs
are Apollonia (d. 249 A.D.), St. Michael the Sabaite (9th Century A.D.) and even St.
Mark, the legendary founder of the Egyptian Church itself.422 In recent times, studies
have demonstrated that the Coptic Church has been heavily glorifying the idea of
martyrdom.423 In fact, during a sociological study by Nora Steen, a Coptic Sunday
school teacher asked a class of four year olds if they were afraid to die as martyrs. The
answer was a resounding and collective “NO!”424 Even Coptic websites proudly display
pictures of Egyptian Christians “martyrs” who were killed by Islamist violence in recent
years.425

According to Sameh Fawzy, a Coptic journalist with al-Watani, the re-

emergence of martyr rhetoric was designed to shore up the community psychologically
during Islamist militant violence under Sadat.426 While this may have had some positive
impact, George Ishak, director of the popular opposition group Kifaya argues that instead
of focusing on making the world better, many Copts simply “dream of heaven.”427
Evidence also points to a sense of Coptic exceptionalism over the centuries,
despite the fact that modem scholars argue that there are almost no ethnic, linguistic or
cultural differences between Coptic Christians and Muslims.

A'JQ

In fact, research has

shown that over ninety-percent of Egyptian Muslims have Coptic origins.429 Both
communities even share customs often thought to be purely Islamic, such as female

Nisan, 150.
422 Watterson, 28, Zaborowski, 20, and Pearson, 102.
423 Van Doom-Harder and Vogt, 124.
424 S h atzm iller, 4 1 .

425 “The Funeral Prayers and Biographies o f the 21 Martyrs o f al-Kosheh,” U.S. Copts Association
(accessed 15 July 2006); available from http://www.copts.net/photos.asp.
426 Informal interview with Sameh Fawzy, Coptic Journalist for al-Watani. (Cairo, Egypt, 17 October
2005).
427 Informal interview with George Ishak, Head o f the Kifaya Movement. (Cairo, Egypt, 14 December
2005).
428 Chitham, 17 and Shatzmiller, 35.
429 Chitham, 18 and Wakin, 5. Wakin’s estimate was slightly lower, at eighty-percent.
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veiling.430 In his famous quote, Lord Cromer describes a Copt as an Egyptian who prays
in a church, while a Muslim was an Egyptian who prays in a m osque431 Despite the
overwhelming evidence however, there still is a sense amongst Christians that they are
the purest descendants of the ancient Egyptians.

This belief is not a recent

development, but is in fact, centuries old. One of the earliest and most vivid examples of
this mentality can be found in the 13th Century Coptic manuscript The Martyrdom o f
John o f Phaijoit.

The story of an Egyptian Christian who converts to Islam only to be

martyred for wishing to return to Christianity, the manuscript sheds incredible insight
into ideals of Christian exceptionalism. Arguing that Muslims in Egypt were Arabs and
not pharonic Egyptians, the story discusses intermarriage as polluting to the Coptic
community.433 Christians therefore were warned to avoid Islam’s “sexual traps”.434
John’s martyrdom at the end of the tale is described as spiritual purification for the sin of
conversion.435 This belief continued well into the early 20th Century, as Kyriakos
Mikhail writings on the Copts in Egypt demonstrate. He describes Muslims as Arabs and
states that Christians are the only true Egyptians.436 Coptic Christians have kept their
blood pure of “semi-barbarous Arabs and savage Kurds”.437 Christians who converted to
Islam intermixed and were no longer purely Egyptian 438 Muslims would forever be
“occupiers”.439

Even today, hardline Copts still speak of themselves as the true

430 Chitham, 20 and Hasan 18-19.
431 H ssan , 18.

432 Van Doom-Harder and Vogt, 126.
433 Zaborowski, 6.
434 Ibid., 20.
435 Ibid., 13.
436 Mikhail, viii.
437 Ibid., viii.
438 Ibid., viii.
439 Ibid., 19.
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Egyptians.440 In 2005, a DVD was released which consisted of a play preformed in a
Coptic Church two years earlier. The play I Once Was Blind but Now I See, tells the
story of a man who is convinced to become a Muslim in return for money and a wife,
only to face death when he returns to Christianity.441 Not surprisingly, the play almost
identically mirrors the plot of 13th Century story of John of Phaijoit.
Even the use of the term “Copt” has become highly politicized, as Muslims often
believe that the word, when applied solely to Christians, implies that they are more
Egyptian than any other group.442 While more moderate Copts and Muslims argue that all
people within the country are equally Egyptian,443 notions of exceptionalism do still
exist. Given that the state is dominated by Muslims, these philosophies argue energy
would be better spent on more important Christian pursuits outside Egypt’s political
mainstream.
The beliefs outlined above form the foundation of Coptic communal solidarity.
This identity stresses a historical mindset of sacrifice and exceptionalism, while
encouraging believers that material power is not as important as spiritual growth. In the
modem context, this translates into a community which is more pre-occupied with
religious endeavours than political ones. Discussion will now move however, from this
examination of ideologies to a focus on how the Coptic Orthodox Church was able to
assume a hegemonic role over the community.

440 Sameh Fawzy, interview.
441 Robin Moger and John Ehab, “All Over a Play,” Cairo Magazine. Issue 29, Oct 27- Nov 2 2005.
442 Informal Interview with Ehab Salem, human rights activist. (Cairo, Egypt, 8 September 2005).
443 Van Doom-Harder and Vogt, 22 and Karim al-Gawhary “Copts in the ‘Egyptian Fabric’,” Middle East
Report No. 200 (July-September, 1996), 21.
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Church Controls Over the Coptic Community
During the 19th Century, the Orthodox Coptic Church was the target of increasing
criticism from various Christian groups in Egypt. One of the most outspoken critics were
evangelist Christians newly arrived from Europe who claimed the Orthodox clergy was
hopelessly corrupt.444 Secular Coptic Christians were also greatly concerned about the
lack of transparency within the Church, and pushed to have greater control over the
community’s wealth. To that end, despite strong protest from the clergy, a council of
layman were formed in 1874 and was named the Maglis al-Milli. The council’s role was
controversial but its secular members were committed to having a say over Coptic
national affairs.445 Until this time, these matters were handled by the Holy Synod of the
Coptic Church, the highest ecclesiastical body within the clergy.446 While the Church
had been attempting to increase its powers over all Christian judicial matters,447 the
Maglis sought to limit their influence to religious considerations only.448 One of the key
controversies between the Maglis and the Synod was over which would control monastic
endowments or waqf.449 According to secular Copts, the clergy was mismanaging the
funds to the detriment of the community. One example they used to highlight this was
the monastery at Deir al-Muharraq, which was in need of serious renovations despite the
fact that it produced a massive eighty-seven percent annual net-profit.450 The Maglis
called for a special council to be formed to handle all Coptic endowments. This council
would be elected by the Maglis and approved by the Patriarch. The Patriarch and the
444 Carter, 26.
445 Nisan 139.
446 Meinardus, 9.
447 Muhammad Afifi, “The State and the Church in Nineteenth Century Egypt,” Die Welt des Tslams Vol.
39, No. 3 (November 1999): 280.
448 Hasan, 58.
449 Carter, 28.
450 Ibid., 42.
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synod did not back down from the challenge however, and spared no effort in resisting
any encroachment of its powers 451 Other later disputes arose during the following
decades when the Maglis attempted to influence who was elected as patriarch of the
Church452
For the most part however, Copts outside of the upper class gave their loyalty to
the clergy.453 This is supported by British reports during the early twentieth century
which argued that Copts outside of Cairo largely did not have the same political
ideologies as the elite. The British went further to say that attempts by secular Copts to
mobilize (specifically during the 1911 conference in Asyut), represented the will of
upper-class Copts only (about 12,000 out of 700,000 Christians in Egypt) 454 Although
these conclusions were criticized by Coptic intellectuals who believed British findings to
be superficial,455 the role of the Church would increase drastically after the country’s elite
were weakened under the presidency of Gamal Abdul Nasser.
Moreover, the upper class of the Coptic community spumed most of the
ideologies discussed during this chapter as superstition 456 According to S.S. Hasan, the
Coptic elite had “no notion of indigenous culture, it is a neo-colonial identity with
international flavours”.457 It was this cultural dichotomy which encouraged much of the
tension between Coptic elite and the clergy during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
The political challenge to the Coptic Church by Christian upper class would be ended
however, during the policies of the 1952 Revolution. The victory of the Free Officer’s

451 Ibid., 29, 34-36.
452 Ibid., 29.
453 Ibid., 41.
454 Mikhail, 2 1,36.
455 Ibid., 21.
456 Hasan, 5.
457 Hasan, 5.
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Movement over the monarchy led to aggressive economic reforms that would have a
devastating effect on all of Egypt’s wealthy elite.

In 1952, laws were promulgated

limiting land ownership to a maximum of two - three hundred feddans (in 1961, this was
again reduced to a maximum of one hundred feddans).458 The remaining lands, as well as
over 15,000 foreign businesses, were nationalized, including British and French
companies which controlled the Suez Canal.459 Landowners were broken as Nasser
moved Egypt to a strict command economy.460 The economic policies of the Revolution
would severely strike at the Coptic elite, as the community lost seventy-five percent of its
wealth, forcing the closure of schools and other social institutions 461 Even the Church
was targeted, with real-estate and waqfs (endowments) being nationalized 462 In response,
thousands of Copts emigrated to Europe and North America in order to protect their
wealth.463
The damage to the Coptic elite was not only economic, but political as well.
•

fVi

Despite their involvement with politics during the first half of the 20 Century, Christians
played almost no part in the Free Officers Movement which overthrew the monarchy and
would not share in power afterwards.464 Christian representation in parliament dropped
to less than one percent,465 as the community was systematically removed from the
diplomatic service, education and economic ministries.466 The collapse of the upper class

458 V atik io tis, 3 9 2 .

459 Ibid., 389, 392.
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465 Shatzmiller, 26.
466 Nisan, 145.
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left the Coptic middle class as the dominate members of the community. Unlike the elite,
these Christians were much more religious, and much closer to the clergy.467
Nasser’s reforms did not purposefully target the Coptic elite more than their
Muslim counterparts. In order to set up authoritarian control however, all competitors
outside of the Free Officer’s Movement needed to be suppressed. That said, many of
Nasser’s policies actually helped the Coptic Church, especially the massive effort to
undermine Islamists groups like the Muslim Brotherhood 468 Nasser even allowed the
Church to build a massive cathedral in Cairo during the 1960s, in order to maintain
Coptic goodwill.469 Nasser did try to undermine some Coptic groups, outlawing one
radical movement, the al-Ummah al-Qibtiyyah, an organization with almost 100,000
members.470 He also passed a law dissolving the Maglis al-Milli in 1962.471 Nasser’s
rhetoric would make it clear that his policies were not designed to persecute Copts, but to
create a structure of authoritarianism. Negative remarks would target only what he saw
to be Coptic fanatics who were “obsessed” with being a minority.472
The hegemony of the Orthodox Church, as briefly mentioned above, was also
challenged by foreign Christian denominations.

When foreign Christian missionaries

entered the country during the 19th Century, they expected the Orthodox Church to be
their natural ally 473 Contrary to their expectations, the Coptic Church vehemently
resisted Western missionaries, especially those from the Catholic Church.474 These
efforts have largely been successful, as statistics demonstrate ninety to ninety-five
467 Hasan, 58.
468 Ibid., 104.
469 Ibid., 104.
470 Solihin, 17.
471 Meinardus, 74.
472 Wakin, 69.
473 Solihin, 47.
474 Ibid, 31, 33.
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percent of Egyptian Christians remain in the Orthodox Church.475 Even Copts that have
converted to other Christian sects maintain a link with the Orthodox clergy, attending
festivals and even choosing to get married within their traditional Church.476
Now that evidence has been presented to demonstrate the potential of Church
hegemony over the Coptic Christian community, the remainder of this chapter will focus
tVi

on how hegemony was obtained. During the late 19

Century, the Orthodox Church

itself was undergoing calls from within to reform. Amongst the clergy, pressure rose to
remove the stagnate “old guard”.477 Efforts began slowly, as Pope Kyrillos IV (18541866) began to push for changes to the liturgy and communal infrastructure.

4.7R

Many

reforms would also be inspired by lay members of the community, such as Habib Girgis,
who started the enormously successful Sunday School Movement in 19 18.479 This
program, largely designed to counter protestant evangelism in the Coptic community
worked to increase the importance of traditional Christian rituals with the Egyptian
youth.480 As the program grew in strength, it helped train Coptic Christians respond to
religious polemics from various sources which criticized Orthodox Christian beliefs.481
The program’s success was so great that by 1940, over 42,000 students were enrolled in
religious classes.482
Renewal of Christian religious fervour can also be seen largely as a response to
growing Islamist movements amongst Muslims.483 Whereas the first such signs of

475 H asan , 2 0 a n d S h a tz m ille r, 90.
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revival were seen within the secular community, momentum would quickly shift towards
a clergy-dominated movement. During the mid-twentieth century, the Church had begun
to consolidate its authority in the community.484 Factions within the clergy began to push
for the Orthodox Church to reorganize itself to meet modem challenges. Before reforms
took root corruption was rampant, with many Coptic priests so poorly funded that they
either sold “healing miracles” or concentrated on serving the rich members of the
community at the expense of their congregation.485 Under Pope Kyrillos VI (1959-1971),
modernization efforts would end this and would accelerate restoration on various
monasteries throughout Egypt.486
In order to be effective at resistance from other factions in the clergy, reformers
•

cloaked their rhetoric within calls to return to the fundamentals of faith.

487

•

• •

Activities and

projects inspired by the reform movement made strong use of traditional images and
ideologies to deflect criticism and successfully shield the movement from resistance.

4.88

According to S.S. Hasan, these reforms, though radical, were much more a case of
revival than revolution.489
The current Pope of the Orthodox Church, Shenuda III, is also largely responsible
for the clergy’s return to power.490 A strong believer in Church-based social programs,
the patriarch argued strongly during the 1970s for the Christian community to re-vamp
and reorganize themselves.491 Since then, the Church has helped fund schools, hospitals
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and services to communities which the state could not afford to help.492 Beyond just
basic amenities however, several programs have been designed specifically to help assert
Coptic loyalty towards the clergy. One program, the Nota Ruhiyah (spiritual notebook)
movement would travel to villages throughout Egypt offering medical aid to Christians.
While there, observers would catalogue for the Church the spiritual conditions of its
residents.493 Another program, Bayl al-Khilwah (house of retreat) was created to allow
teens to experience the monastic lifestyle of the clergy. This experience leaves many
teens with a higher respect and connection with the monasteries and even convinces some
to later join the monastery as adults 494 Student groups like Usar Jamiiyah Qibtiyyah have
also been organized mainly to help Christians defend against campus Islamists groups.495
The clergy even has an official position, the Bishop of Youth, whose task it is to integrate
youth within the “clerical space”.496
By and large, these programs have been extremely successful, as the Coptic
Christian community have increasingly turned to the Church since the 1952 Revolution.
Turning inwards towards Christian social groups have given Copts a sphere where they
can exercise control and are no longer the minority.497 Although critics often argue that
the Pope’s policies are placing a cocoon around his community,498 increasing numbers of
educated Coptic professions are turning to the clergy as a career,499 and even secular
social activities within the community are now largely preceded by prayers.500 Even

492 Carter, 48.
493 Hasan, 79.
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when President Sadat tried to re-vive the Maglis al-Milli to weaken the Church, the
Council’s secular members would no longer challenge the clergy and generally followed
the instructions of the Patriarch.501
Reforms have also centralized the clergy under the papacy’s authority.
Traditionally, Coptic Bishops have always shown deep respect for the patriarch, often
prostrating to him to demonstrate devotion.502 Ceremony aside however, Shenuda has
worked hard to end the semi-feudal arrangement of Egypt’s dioceses, dividing districts in
strategically in order to help him select his supporters as bishops.503 The Patriarch has
also successfully reconnected parishes in the diaspora with his central authority and has
reintegrated them within the hierarchy of Coptic Church.504 Challenges within the clergy
still occur, such as a 2002 movement which saw a group of Christians claim that the Holy
Spirit declared they were to be the leaders of the Orthodox Church.505 Another challenge
came from Bishop Maximus I, who declared he would now lead a new Church in Egypt
in 2006.506 Largely these challenges are not effective against the power of the papacy, as
Pope Shenuda has demonstrated a willingness to excommunicate those that challenge his
authority.
The impact of the Church’s control and the dominance of traditional mentalities
outlined earlier in this chapter led to a Coptic identity which pledges allegiance first to
religion and only than to the Egyptian state.507 A half-century of communal organization

501 Ibid., 139.
502 Ibid., 6.
503 Ibid., 124-127.
504 Ibid., 129.
505 “Egyptian Church Dismisses 13 Clerics,” BBC News Online 5 July 2002, accessed on 28 July 2006;
available from http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/middle_east/2100001 .stm.
506 “Egyptians Sue New Church Leader,” BBC News Online 4 July 2006, accessed on 28 July 2006;
available from http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/middle_east/5145988.stm.
507 Shatzmiller, 34.
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has left the Church in control of social services in return for the right to be a
spokesperson for all Egyptian Christians.508 Shenuda consistently encourages Copts to
focus on the creation of a separate Christian sphere under Church control.509
Commitment to the new Church means a withdrawal from mainstream Egyptian political
activities.510 This has been extremely detrimental to Coptic political participation in
Egypt, and has given the Pope the capability to negotiate a clientelist relationship with
President Mubarak.

508 Ibid., 77.
509 Hasan, 99.
510 Shatzmiller, 76.
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C h a p t e r S i x : T h e C l ie n t e l is t R e l a t io n s h ip B e t w
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State

The previous chapters have discussed questions of theory, explored elements of
the Egyptian political landscape and the dynamics of Coptic religious sphere. During the
last chapter, it was demonstrated that the Coptic Orthodox Church has set itself up as the
hegemonic contact point between the Christian community and the Egyptian state. In this
chapter, the nature of this relationship will be explored and described.
In Chapter Two, the ideal modern clientelist system was described as a
progression where regional brokers had a declining share of power within the system.
As the state’s bureaucratic power solidified, patron politicians could increasingly connect
with their clients directly. Chapter Five has demonstrated that within the context of the
Christian-State relationship, this is not the case. The institution of the Coptic Orthodox
Church stands in between regime and the possibility of forming a Christian client base.
Does the Church therefore represent a broker as demonstrated in figure 6.1?

T he S ta te
political support

B ro k e r (O rth o d o x C h u rc h )
political su pport

econom ic re so u rc es

C lie n t P o p u la tio n
(C o p tic C h ris tia n s )

Figure 6.1: M odel o f the Church as a Clientelist Broker
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There are several problems with the above model.

First, the last chapter has

demonstrated that the Church itself provides social programs for Coptic Christians
without the help of the state. Rather than a simple transmission of the patron state’s
resources directly to the client, these programs appear to originate within the Orthodox
Church itself. Moreover, the Church was able to provide these resources under state
pressure during President Sadat. The state seemingly has no direct control over these
resources and does not control the loyalty of the client. In the words of S.S. Hasan, the
Christian religious space had become entirely a political counter-space within Egypt.511
The following paragraphs will therefore explore the possibility of a more complex model
while examining the interactions between the Coptic Christian religious sphere and the
state.
The lack of state control over the Church’s sphere of influence is strongly
demonstrated during the presidency of Anwar Sadat, who routinely attacked Pope
Shenuda on the grounds of trying to form a state within a state.512 Sadat’s arguments
were most likely sincere, as he believed the Christian community was setting up an
institutional autonomy that threatened national unity.513 Shenuda’s activities were highly
politicized, with his bible study meetings more often then not resembling large Christian
rallies. In reality, the autonomy of the Christian sphere was not calling for the violent
creation of separate state. It did however, threaten the systemic authoritarian patronclient described in Chapter Three, as Shenuda pressured the Coptic Christian community
to not cooperate with the state under Sadat.514 Not surprisingly, the threat of one group

511 Hasan, 262.
512 Solihin, 82.
513 Van-Doom Harder and Vogt, 249.
514 Nisan, 150.
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breaking away from the regime’s system of control would contribute greatly to the
destabilization of authoritarianism within the state, making it essential for Sadat to keep it
from succeeding. So significant was the growing power of the Church that it led directly
to Shenuda’s arrest under Presidential decree 439 of 1981.515 According to John Watson,
Shenuda had “dabbled his hands in politics and burnt his fingers”.516 There is a truth to
this statement, as Sadat’s actions strongly demonstrated that the Church was still
vulnerable to the regime’s power.

Indicted in the Court of Values, Shenuda faced

charges of endangering national unity and peace, provoking hatred of the government,
giving the Church “political overtones” and inciting conflict by ordering bishops to
coerce and manipulate the government.517 Only the controversy over carrying out a case
against the Pope’s sacred position prevented Shenuda from being tried.518 This still did
not protect the Coptic Patriarch completely however, as Sadat used his position to appoint
five of Shenuda’s opponents to run the Church while the patriarch was under house
arrest.

During their tenure, the Church would no longer engage in the politicized

activities that were characteristic of Shenuda’s rule.519
The transition to the Mubarak presidency however, would symbolize a dramatic
shift for the Coptic Patriarch. The first indications of this shift occurred during a trip by
President Mubarak to the White House which was to be disrupted by Coptic Christians
within the diaspora who demanded the release of Shenuda. Personally appealing to his
followers while under house arrest, Shenuda commanded Copts to “welcome the new

Van-Doom Harder and Vogt, 249.
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President in love and submission...”520 Later in 1983, Shenuda would write several
letters to Mubarak declaring confidence in his work for national unity.521 Eventually it
was decided by the ruling party to release Shenuda in 1985, provided the patriarch abided
by several key limits.

These included Shenuda avoided making political statements,

regularly returned to the desert to spend time in the monastery, avoided Cairo on Fridays
and limited appearances in Alexandria. The three latter conditions were in response to
threats against the Patriarch’s life but still represented key restrictions on his activities.

522

During his first service after being released from confinement, Shenuda described the
liturgy as “a wonderful meeting of Love, arranged for you by our President, Hosni
Mubarak.”523
During the Mubarak era, Shenuda has been “at peace” with the ruling party, at all
times being extremely cordial with the President and constantly preaching tolerance for
Muslims.524

The nature of this transition is quite startling, considering Shenuda’s

controversial personality. Even before becoming Pope, Shenuda had to be restrained as a
bishop from confrontational activities which had disturbed the patience of President
Nasser.

r9 c

During the Mubarak period however, Shenuda consistently espoused a “turn

the cheek” martyr philosophy to his followers.526 Shenuda’s public activities were no
longer political, but have focused entirely on ecclesiastical matters.

Despite the

temptation to say that the Pope’s reversal is completely due to a feeling of vulnerability
to the state, the actual foundation of policy shift is rooted in an understanding that
520 Ibrahim, The Copts o f Egypt. 20.
521 Watson, 112.
522 Watson, 116.
523 Ibid., 116.
524 Shatzmiller 62.
525 Hasan, 85.
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527 Watson, 117.

109

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

President Mubarak would spend a significant amount of time undermining Islamists
extremist groups which had constantly harassed Christians.

c-yo

t

t

,

While its true violence

against Christians has not ceased completely, as evident in Chapter Four, this simple
agreement would form the base of the clientelist arrangement between Church and State.
Mubarak, unlike Sadat, has also made no attempt to criticize Coptic autonomy, and has
allowed the Church to independently control the Coptic Christian community. Moreover,
Mubarak maintains contact only with the clergy, and does not meet with secular Christian
political activists.529
Despite this, according to Gasser Abdel Razek from the Egyptian Organization
for Human Rights, there have been only superficial improvements in Christian rights
under President Mubarak.530

Many of these improvements have been religious

concessions, such as the declaration that Coptic Christmas was to be a national
holiday.531 Other concessions include forcing Christians who want to convert to Islam to
sit with Coptic priests in private to confirm that there is no outside pressure and to give
the Church an opportunity to convince the person to not become an apostate.532 There
have also been concessions with regards to the official school curriculum, which now
gives some attention to Coptic history.533
Perhaps the most effective concessions by the regime to the Coptic clergy come in
the form of church permits. The current laws regarding the construction or repair of
churches can be traced back to the 1856 Hamayouni Decree which abolished the dhimmi

528 Hasan, 115.
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system in Egypt.534 This act demands that permits for churches must come directly from
the executive authority.535 In 1934 this law was strengthened by the Interior Ministry,
which added several conditions for building churches.

These conditions insisted that

permits required a report included which answered the following questions: Was the land
empty or agricultural? Was the person who owned the land presenting the request? What
was the distance to the nearest mosque? Is it near a Christian or Muslim settlement? Do
nearby Muslims object? Does the head of the denomination approve of this request? Is
there a church of the same denomination already in the town and what is the Christian
population of the area? Finally, was the proposed church near government resources and
if so, does it have the proper approval from the relevant ministry?536 Even after the
relevant answers were collected, permits were difficult to obtain. In fact, during the
period between 1981 and 1990, only ten permits for church construction and twenty-six
for church repairs were issued.537 Permits are not necessarily rejected, but are often
delayed for years, even several decades.

Repairs need not be significant to be delayed,

as some pending requests included permission to attach an awning to a church in Asyut,
and even permission for another to knock down a wall within their own building.
Efforts are made more complicated by intolerant segments of Muslim communities who
attempt to complicate the process as much as possible. Unlike churches, mosques can be
built without any special permit.540 In some instances, mosques were hastily constructed

534 Shatzmiller, 25.
535 Negad al-Borai. The Guillotine and the Pit: Freedom o f Expression n Egypt 2002-2003 (Cairo: Embassy
o f Switzerland, 2004), 22.
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next to land being approved for a church in order to raise complaints.541 Obviously,
given the frustrating environment, many Christians have proceeded with church
construction without proper permits.542 This tactic can be extremely dangerous however,
as several churches built without permission have been struck by arsonists.543
The controversial nature of church construction therefore makes the approval of
proper permits a very significant gesture which the ruling party has used to maintain a
clientelist relationship with the clergy.

Despite statements that the clergy is politically

neutral, secular Coptic experts like George Ishak and Sameh Fawzy are convinced that
they are steadfast in their support for the National Democratic Party.544 According to
Sameh Fawzy, there is a direct correlation to instances where the clergy has provided the
ruling party with their support, and in return received the approval of church permits.
This was particularly the case with the 2005 presidential elections, where the Church
officially endorsed President Mubarak in return for the approval of permits.545

Soon

afterwards, the President made further concessions announcing a policy shift regarding
church permits which allowed repairs to be made while awaiting approval. This is quite a
significant gain, particularly when in addition to other recent decrees which stipulate that
repairs now only needed approval from the regional governor, rather than from the
President himself.546
Despite the implication that the Church plays a hegemonic role in the lives of all
Coptic Christians, political activists do exist. Many work with secular human rights

541 Hssan, 210.
542 Watson, 67.
543 Van-Doom Harder and Vogt, 249.
544 George Ishak interview and Sameh Fawzy interview.
545 Sameh Fawzy interview.
546 “Church Building Regulations Eased,” Human Rights Without Frontiers 19 December 2005 [online
report]; accessed on 31 July 2006; available from http://www.hrwf.net/html/2005PDF/Egypt_2005.pdf.
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groups within the country, because Christian NGOs focus almost entirely on development
issues.547 According to Ahmed Samih, Director of the Al-Andalus Center for Tolerance
and Anti-Violence Studies, Egyptian human rights NGOs have to struggle to pull the
youth away from Church programs in order to get them involved.548 George Ishak,
Director o f the opposition movement Kifaya agrees, but states that this is difficult
considering the state surrounds the youth at such an early age.549 Pressure on Copts to
join Church organizations is extremely pronounced, and people who refuse to get
involved in Church programs are often ostracized and labelled in front of the community
as individuals whose hearts are “closed” to their faith.550 The clergy is also prepared to
utilize its highest censure on secular Coptic Christians who are too vocal with their
criticism of the Church or the government, threatening to excommunicate those who
protest the system too vocally.551
The preceding paragraphs demonstrate a system which is much more complex
than a simple patron-broker-client chain. The model in figure 6.1 simply does not
demonstrate this level of autonomy which is present in the transactions between the
clergy and the Coptic community, transactions which were able to maintain themselves
despite the concerted efforts of President Sadat. What instead appears to develop is a
vertical hierarchy o f independent clientelist relationships in which the ruling party
accepts the autonomous hegemony of the Church over the Coptic community in return
for political support and endorsements. The nature of the relationship would therefore be
more accurately illustrated in Figure 6.2:
547 Sameh Fawzy interview.
548 Ahmed Samih, interview.
549 George Ishak interview.
550 Hasan, 187.
551 Off the record.
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C o -o p te d
C o p t ic C h r is tia n s

Figure 6.2: Clientelist model demonstrating vertical hierarchy o f independent clientelist relationships

As the above model demonstrates, the clientelist relationship between the Coptic
community and the Egyptian state is actually two independent but symbiotic transactions
which together maintains the autonomy of the Coptic religious sphere (relationship two)
while supporting the state (relationship one).

Secular Christian activists have their

activities frustrated by the Orthodox Church and therefore cannot work to help the
community increase its political involvement. One seemingly glaring omission would be
the lack of input of Islamic militants in the model. This is due to the argument presented
in Chapter Four, which maintains that extremists expose a vulnerability within the Coptic
community which pressure it to maintain the clientelist relationship with the state. The
inclusion of the Islamists in the model is therefore relegated to state’s moves to
undermine them.
The lack of Coptic participation in Egyptian government is therefore in some
sense voluntary. The co-opted community is willing to project an identity of political
apathy in return for the social programs and opportunities provided by the Church, while
the clergy itself is allowed to maintain this sphere because of their support for the ruling
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NDP party.

Low levels of Christian political involvement are therefore much more

complicated than a simple case of minority persecution, as many would suggest. It is, in
many ways, simply another facet of a phenomenon which frustrates all opposition groups
in non-democratic

governments,

a phenomenon which

is a key reason for

authoritarianism throughout the Middle East.
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The purpose of this study was to develop a more complex understanding of why
Egyptian Christians are largely absent from the mainstream Egyptian political sphere. In
pursuing this question, it has become increasingly clear that the apathetical political role
of the Coptic Christian community is not simply a case of a persecuted minority as many
assume. History demonstrates that the Coptic Christians have a legacy of political
participation within the mainstream Egyptian political sphere during the early 20th
Century, and today are completely economically integrated with the Muslim majority.
They have the resources to become involved if they so choose. In many ways, the choice
to remain isolated is not based on the need to escape persecution but simply another
manifestation of a systemic clientelist which maintains authoritarian systems throughout
the Arab region.
Why would this particular relationship develop however? Why would the ruling
party not attempt to enlist the Christian community in their efforts directly, rather than
encouraging an indirect clientelist relationship?

The key to this requires a step

backwards to appreciate the wider context of modem Egyptian politics. Both the Coptic
Christian community and the ruling party under President Mubarak have the same
primary concern, specifically, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist
groups in Egyptian politics.

Faced with a possible religious government, the Coptic

Church has forgone a democracy that could bring militant Islam to power.552 This once
again raises the question however of why the ruling party does not mobilize Christians
and give them a prominent place within the party, as was the case with the Wafd party

552 Negad al-Borai, interview.
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during the pre-revolutionary period. The simple answer is that, faced with an Islamist
opposition, the ruling party cannot often risk nominating Christians for elections. Such a
strategy would be open to exploitation by Islamist parties whose entire platform revolves
around embracing Islam as a solution to modem problems. This creates a dynamic by
which religious character is used in individual races, a factor often pragmatically
manipulated by all parties.553 By running Muslim candidates, the NDP undermines the
religious discourse of Islamists at least to some extent.
Of course the motivations for creating such a carefully balanced clientelist system
go beyond short term electoral considerations.

Perhaps the best explanation of this

relationship’s strength and pervasiveness comes from the Director of the Group for
Democratic Development, Negad al-Borai. The foundation of the problem in his opinion
is that no group actually wants to solve it. The “Coptic card” is played by all sides
without regard for Christian rights. The Church enjoys playing the “victim role” in order
to demand concessions, while the ruling party considers the Copts a “hostage” to
negotiate strategic concessions from the United States and Europe in Mubarak’s never
ending strategy to balance groups off one another.

Even secular Copts within the

international diaspora wish for the current situation to continue to maintain funding and
support for their NGOs.554
Is everything a simple matter of pragmatic and calculated strategies with no
concern for positive advancement? While practical considerations are significant, it is
essential to remember that each actor within the system believes it is making a positive
contribution for the people of Egypt. President Mubarak and the ruling party believe

553 George Ishak, interview.
554 Negad al-Borai, interview.
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their secular stance and centralized power base provides all Egyptians with a secure
environment to prosper. The political landscape is simply too tenuous to risk loosing to
extremists. The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists believe that the religion of
Islam is an ideology which promotes freedom, equality and transparency, ideal values for
anyone within the public trust. They believe their opposition to the ruling party is the key
to liberal concessions and democratization within the government.555 The Coptic Church,
for its part, believes that it has the best ability of any Christian group to strengthen and
maintain the Egyptian Christian identity through religious and social programs.

Its

organizational base and legitimacy allows the clergy to be the perfect contact point with
the state to ensure Coptic rights. Secular Christians on the other hand argue that true
strength cannot come from isolating the Coptic community in an autonomous social and
political sphere.

Direct representation in government will ensure that religious and

political concerns are weighted without bias in the best interests of the community.
According to Sameh Fawzy, Copts will only reap the rewards of political reform within
Egypt if they are involved in the process of opening up the system. In his words, “you
can’t be a good citizen in heaven without being one on Earth”.556
These differences of opinion strike a central reality of Egyptian politics today. A
country that has so often been told by its leaders that there is only one legitimate course
towards development and liberty is now arguably fragmenting despite the weight of the
state’s political restrictions. With such a diversity of peoples, histories and identities,
Egyptian plurality is beginning to manifest itself through every opportunity that appears.
To many, this uncertainty is a frightening prospect, as every political group resists those

555 Essam al-Erian, interview.
556 Sameh Fawzy, interview.
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who feel there is a different path into the future. What is clear however, is that clientelist
relationships, including those between the Coptic Orthodox Church and the ruling party
are becoming increasingly challenged from all directions within the country. Whether
they successfully resist, evolve or collapse however is uncertain.
In many ways, this study hopefully represents a first step towards greater
understanding of an area defined by a distinct literature deficit. It does not however,
provide a definitive last word on the subject. This study was blessed with access to many
experts from a variety of perspectives that would answer direct questions with frankness
and honesty. That said, resources were simply too limited to provide empirical evidence
to scientifically measure many of the phenomena that were described during interviews.
In reality, under current conditions within the country, it is difficult to believe any study
could find direct evidence of an official clientelist agreement between the Church and
state. First, such a transparency is not a characteristic of clientelist agreements in any
system.

As discussed earlier, these relationships are informal and lack any clear

institutional evidence. Secondly, the transforming political nature of the Egyptian system
makes discussion of sensitive topics difficult. Often those who are the most involved in
policy making will offer researchers the least answers.
Despite these obstacles, future research does have enormous potential to test,
modify and contribute to the conclusions of this study. Just as this thesis rests upon the
invaluable research of scholars such as Negad al-Borai, S.S. Hasan, John Watson, B.L.
Carter, Nelly Van Doom-Harder and Otto F. Meinardus, other studies will hopefully be
able to use the ideas presented here in order to shed more light onto the Coptic Christians
of Egypt.

One possibility can be for attention to be given to drawing statistical
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relationships between church permits and important political events as well as examining
the activities and statements of Coptic clergy in response to acts of extremist violence
during the Sadat and Mubarak period. In fact, the oft-mentioned research deficiency
represents a practically limitless assortment of options which future studies can explore.
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